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TREA TY-BASED RIGHTS
A Introduction
Treaties are traditionally construed as agreements freely
negotiated and entered into by sovereign nations. Only sovereign
states and international organizations can conclude treaties, and these
legal instruments create rights and duties under public international
law. Yet, often, and increasingly so since World War II, treaties do
also touch upon private individuals.' For example, the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR") gives individual
foreign detainees the right to be promptly notified by public law
enforcement officials of their right to contact their consulate.' Long
gone are the days when treaties were simply a state-to-state matter.
If breached, treaties give rise to international legal
responsibility. States might decide to invoke the international legal
responsibility of the party that violated the treaty, but they have no
legal obligation to do so. It is entirely a matter of discretion; a matter
of carefully balancing benefits and costs within the larger political
framework. Yet, the more treaties touch upon and aim to regulate
interactions between parties across international borders, the more
private individuals should be given the possibility of holding other
private individuals to the same standards. Indeed, some recent
treaties expressly grant individuals rights of action to enforce the
treaty's terms in court.4 For example, as discussed in detail in Part
I. ABRAM CHEYES & ANTONIA CHEYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 14 (1995) ("[T]reaties are formally among states,
and the obligations are cast as state obligations ... [but t]he real object of the treaty... is not to
affect state behavior but to regulate the activities of individuals and private entities.").
Most observers of international law would agree that the past several decades have
seen developments in international law that represent a repudiation of many of the
premises of the classic model .... [International law protecting human rights]
impose[s] obligations on states towards individuals as human beings, not just as
nationals of other states. ... [So a] state's obligation[] to behave in certain ways
towards individuals [is] no longer thought to be owed to the state of the individual's
nationality for the collective benefit of the individuals comprising the state.
Carlos Manual Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1082, 1094 (1992) [hereinafter Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights]. This article uses the term
"private individual" to refer to what international legal scholars call "private," or a natural or
legal person.
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 36,
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]; see infra Part D.2.a.i.A.
3. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 894-95, 917-27 (2004) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Age of Treaties]
(discussing the modem substantive range of self-executing treaties).
4. E.g., Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention on the
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D.2.a.ii, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction allows one parent to sue the other for the return of
their wrongfully abducted child.'
However, this expansion of the right to seek enforcement of
treaties raises a number of issues, particularly in the U.S. federal
system.' Could U.S. courts interpret treaties in such a way as to
imply private rights of action? If the question is answered
affirmatively, then an injured private individual might enforce the
treaty's obligations in federal court because treaties "arise under"
federal law.7  Therefore, this interpretative issue has significant
implications for federal courts' judicial resources!
However, even if the treaty cannot be interpreted to contain an
implied right of action, this article explores the possibility, given the
special status of treaties in international and federal law,9 that state
law causes of action could nonetheless vindicate a private
individual's treaty-based rights in federal court.'
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see infra Parts D.2.a.ii, D.2.b.ii.
5. Hague Convention, supra note 4.
6. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1889 (2005) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Good Faith] (noting that
every aspect of treaty law is subject to "heated debate").
7. Indeed, much of the recent scholarly debate has focused on those treaties which do not
contain express private rights of action. See generally Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell,
Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145 (1999); John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of
Treaty-Based Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 552 (2006); Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing
International Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 433 (2002);
Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1126.
8. As Louis Henkin has stated:
It has been suggested that if human rights conventions were self-executing, they would
overwhelm the courts. The fear is mistaken. The vast majority of cases arising under a
covenant or convention would be cases that already arise also under the Constitution or
civil rights laws. In any event, if the convention is not self-executing, the United States
is required to implement it by legislation, and the same cases, and the same number of
cases, might then arise under the implementing legislation.
Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 n.23 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin, Ghost]; see also Rosencranz &
Campbell, supra note 7, at 154 (noting that one of the reasons for strictly limiting the sorts of
wrongs which might qualify as violations of the "law[s] of nations" is a concern for "open[ing]
the floodgates" into federal court).
9. "Cases arising under international law.., are within the Judicial Power of the United
States and, subject to constitutional and statutory limitations and requirements of justiciability,
are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(2) (1987).
10. See infra Part D.2.b.
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Treaties are a source of law, both international and national. "
Being law, federal courts should logically have the power to interpret
their provisions. Two reasons for this are the same reasons for
believing that federal courts can most properly adjudicate and
vindicate federal statutory interests: 2 uniformity of decision-
making 3 and expertise. 4  Indeed, both qualities are integral if a
federal court's interpretation of a treaty's application to a particular
case or controversy could, if cavalier, breach an international
obligation.1
5
Be that as it may, in recent history, both the Senate, which gives
the President "Advice and Consent" to the ratification of treaties, 6
and the Executive Branch 7 have gone to considerable pains to keep
treaties out of courts." For instance, they might declare that a treaty
11. Once a treaty has been ratified, it is not only the "law of this land, see U.S. Const., Art.
II, § 2, but also an agreement among sovereign powers .... " Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines
Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2). Indeed, "[i]ntemational law... of
the United States [is] law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several States."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1).
12. This perspective is open to much debate. E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity
Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1991); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1977). Some scholars strongly believe that not only are state courts just as equipped to interpret
and enforce federal law, but they may be better at it. Michael E. Solomine & James L. Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity,
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). See infra note 162 for a discussion of one author's view
of parity in the context of international custody disputes.
13. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
14. In addition, scholars argue that the "express inclusion of treaties within the judicial
power of Article III means that final authority over their interpretation also falls within the formal
province of the federal courts." Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1896.
15. "Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the designation of treaties as 'the supreme Law
of the Land' serves to protect against the international embarrassment and friction that would
flow from subsequent interference by the legislatures or courts of the individual states." Id. at
1897 (arguing for a revival of the doctrine of "good faith" interpretation of treaties).
16. The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.... ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
17. Quigley, supra note 7, at 554.
18. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1973-74 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo,
Globalism]. One noted scholar has attributed this to the "ghost" of Senator Bricker. Henkin,
Ghost, supra 8, at 349. A recent example of the Executive Branch completely divesting treaty
interpretation from courts is found in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA"), signed
into law by President George W. Bush on October 17, 2006. Military Commissions Act of 2006,
S. 3930, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006). For one, this bill included provisions which completely prevent
courts from relying on the Geneva Conventions. Id. ("No person may invoke the Geneva
Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action .... "). In
addition, the bill gives the President ultimate authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions. Id. §
6(a)(3). As such, on its face this law appears to prevent any litigant from invoking the protections
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is not "self-executing," thus requiring Congress to pass
implementing legislation. 9 Yet, this practice is problematic and is
sharply criticized by legal scholars.20  For one, implementing
legislation can be slow in coming,2 if it comes at all.2 Once a treaty
of the Geneva Convention. But the implications of these provisions have been largely
overshadowed by controversy about the MCA's suspension of habeus corpus as applied to
detainees. Id. § 7(a). For a sampling of bloggers' treatment of the proposed and passed
legislation, see generally Elisa Massimino, Human Rights First to Congress: Reject
Administration's Military Commissions Proposal, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Sept. 13, 2006,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/etn/2006/statement/260/; Countdown Special Comment:
Death of Habeus Corpus: "Your words are lies, Sir. " (MSNBC television broadcast Oct. 18,
2006), available at http://www.crooksandliars.com/2006/10/18/countdown-special-comment-
death-of-habeas-corpus-your-words-are-lies-sir. The MCA's ultimate implications, and indeed,
its constitutionality, are unknown. See Posting of Mark Moller, Is the Military Commission Act
Constitutional?, to Cato-at-Liberty (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/10/04/is-
the-military-commission-act-constitutional (noting that the MCA "is not patently
unconstitutional-but it is hardly on uncontrovertible constitutional footing, either"); see also
Posting of Bobby Chesney, Boumediene v. Bush (Gov't Brief on MCA impact), to National
Security Advisors: A National Security Law Blog (Nov. 15, 2006, 07:58 EST), http://
natseclaw.typepad.com/natseclaw/litigation developments/index.html (discussing the U.S.
government's brief arguing the impact of the MCA on the pending appeals in Boumediene v.
Bush, 450 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2006), and Al Odah v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 2d 37
(D.D.C. 2005), two pending detainee cases).
19. See infra Part B.2.
20. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1959-60 (arguing in favor of non-self-execution,
despite admitting that critics of his position "count among their number every legal scholar to
write on the question").
21. Henkin, Ghost, supra note 8, at 341 n. 1, 347 (noting that President Truman signed and
sent the Genocide Convention, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, to the Senate in 1949, but it did
not come into force in the United States until 1989, and then only with reservations); John
Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 59-60 (1993)
(noting that the General Assembly of the United Nations opened the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("I.C.C.P.R.") for ratification in 1966, the United States became a
signatory in 1977, but did not ratify the Convention until 1992, and it has never been
implemented as such).
22. Some scholars argue that this is because after World War II the United States saw itself
as the savior of Western Europe.
Nineteenth-century judges seemed at pains to show that the United States respected the
rules of the international community.... [But b]y the twentieth century, that sense had
dissipated. The United States had developed a sense of superiority over the Old World.
It no longer needed to prove itself... [and] World War II reinforced this new
perception. The United States had saved the world, at a time when the Old World
powers were on their knees.
Quigley, supra note 7, at 578-79. This superiority complex means the United States is not
concerned with breaching its international obligations. See id. This is in marked contrast with
the early history of the United States. Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1900 n. 103.
Then. the Framers specifically included the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, thus adopting
the New Jersey Plan to the exclusion of the Virginia Plan, to enable the federal courts to ensure
by judicial review that the several states would not violate new international agreements. Id.
Even so, John Yoo, the classic supporter of "unitary" executive power, believes that non-self-
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is ratified and entered into force, it creates obligations under
international law, regardless of whether a sovereign state has
implemented it domestically. If implementing legislation is delayed,
the sovereign state may be violating its obligations under
international law.
But first, a little about what this article is and is not. This article
attempts first to synthesize a complex area of international law, then
narrowly examine a particular use and application of that law-the
law of treaties-in the context of United States domestic law,
specifically, federal question jurisdiction. This article aims to provide
a helpful first look at relevant international principles, before delving
more deeply into the intricacies and complexities of the developing
use of international law by federal courts to determine whether there
is federal jurisdiction in a particular case. This author hopes the
reader can use these sources to sharpen her focus in some instances,
and provide more background in others.
This author assumes her readers have little knowledge of or
experience with international law, and, more specifically, how
treaties are-or are not-being used in federal courts to maintain
federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, the novice reader needs
to be acquainted with some basic concepts of international law
before moving through this article. Therefore, this article attempts to
guide the novice reader through a much-simplified international legal
landscape before discussing the narrow issue of treaty law in the
context of subject matter jurisdiction." In Part B, this article
presents a background of United States treaty history to acquaint the
reader with the relevant legal landscape. This background includes a
history of treaty jurisprudence in the United States in Part B. 1 and a
discussion of one of its central themes, self-execution, in Part B.2.
In Part C, this article provides an introduction to modern
examples of treaties which affect individual rights. This introduction
includes a discussion of interpretative principles which generally
execution is constitutionally preferable because it "maintains a clear separation between the
power to make treaties and the power to make domestic law, and it gives Congress the means to
limit the potentially unbounded Treaty Clause." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1961.
23. International lawyers may view the broad-brush treatment of international law in Parts A
and B of this article as overly simplistic, and, therefore, misleading or incomplete, at best.
Accordingly, readers who need a more nuanced understanding of international law principles
should look beyond this article to the many sources within this article's footnotes that will help
them understand that area of law.
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govern treaties and outlines some analytical distinctions that should
be maintained in the individual rights analysis. In addition, Part C.2
outlines preliminary "avenues and trails" by which a litigant may
plead his or her treaty-based claim in federal court. Finally, this
article creates a framework for a discussion of federal subject matter
jurisdiction as applied to treaty-based rights in Part D.
This article conveys a decidedly "American" point of view in
that it attempts to discuss how federal courts are currently dealing
with treaty law when considering whether there is federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Some international law experts would strongly
disagree with how federal courts are interpreting and using
international law. While these experts raise important and interesting
preemption and separation of powers issues, this article does not pick
sides or advocate a particular position. Instead, this article portrays
how the federal courts are using international law in connection with
federal question jurisdiction.
B. United States Treaty Practice: A Summary
1. A Brief Overview
Until the mid-twentieth century, treaties were relatively rare
occurrences. The world was made of a few dozen sovereign nations
which entered into international agreements to regulate issues of
major political importance, such as borders, alliances, shared
resources or trade. Some states concluded treaties aiming to set the
general tone of their relations, such as treaties of friendship,
extradition agreements, and others relating to "peace, national
defense, and reciprocal rights to commerce and navigation."24
After World War II and the creation of the United Nations, the
treaties' scope and the sheer number of signatories per treaty
25
increased significantly.26 Today, the United States is party to more
24. Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1892.
25. See id. (noting that today many of the four hundred directly enforceable treaties to which
the United States is a party are multilateral).
26. Id. at 1892-93 ("[In contrast to their modest beginnings, treaties now regulate nearly the
full substantive breadth of domestic law, from commercial to criminal law, family to tax law, and
even administrative law and civil procedure."). See generally Van Alstine, Age of Treaties, supra
note 3, at 917-27; Emil Petrossian, Developments, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum:
Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States and England, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257,
1326 (2007); Winston Stromberg, Developments, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International
1456
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than four hundred treaties dealing with a wide variety of topics.2 7
Because of the increasing globalization of economy, trade, and
travel, treaties have increasingly been used to regulate areas that
traditionally were left to individual states to regulate alone through
domestic legislation,28 such as property and family law. 9 Yet,
agreements in these areas necessarily affect private individuals'
primary rights" and duties.
a. Power to negotiate and ratify treaties
The President of the United States has the exclusive power to
negotiate and ratify treaties.' Treaties, once ratified, become the
"supreme Law of the Land. 3 2
Significantly, the Supremacy Clause names treaties in the same
textual sentence as the Constitution and federal statutory law.33 All
three types of law are "supreme" over the laws of the several states,34
and states are expressly forbidden from making their own treaties.35
Therefore, it has long been held that treaties have the same force as
federal statutes,36 even though their scope can reach beyond
Congress' Article 37 powers." As such, judges are required to give
Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1343 (2007).
27. See generally Van Alstine, Age of Treaties, supra note 3, at 917-28 (discussing the
variety of subject matters treaties deal with today).
28. Id. at 922; Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1958 ("International agreements are
becoming more like the permanent statutes and regulations that characterize the domestic legal
system, and less like mutually convenient, and temporary, compacts to undertake state action.").
29. E.g., Hague Convention, supra note 4 (governing the civil aspects of disputing
international parental abductions of children).
30. See infra text accompanying note 115. There are three types of treaties. The one
described in this article is the type outlined in the Constitution, but it is used infrequently. In
contrast, sole executive and congressional executive treaties are utilized more frequently.
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have [the] Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .... ).
32. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ). See generally Van Alstine, Good
Faith, supra note 6, at 1893-94.
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34. Id.
35. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
36. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
37. U.S. CONST. art. 1.
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effect to treaties, 39 and treaties are included within Article III courts'
express jurisdiction." In addition, the President "has the obligation
and necessary authority to take care that [these laws] be faithfully
executed."'41 This obligation and the federal court's jurisdiction are
especially important because treaties are a source of international
obligations towards other sovereign states.42 The United States is in
breach of its international obligations if the President fails to enforce
the terms of a treaty, or if the U.S. courts' treaty interpretation fails
to conform individual behavior to the agreed upon international
standard.43
b. Treaties become the supreme law of the land
Without a provision in the Articles of Confederation allowing
international law to be enforced against the states, the states felt no
need to conform their actions to international law's strictures.44 As a
result, the newly emancipated nation's reputation on the international
stage suffered.45 When the Constitution was debated, there was
considerable disagreement regarding how to rectify the Articles of
Confederation's neglect of treaties.46
During the final stages of discussion, the Framers were
presented with two options: the "New Jersey" and the "Virginia"
38. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. c (1987). Contra Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 451-58 (1998).
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority .... ).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. c (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
42. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (noting that a treaty can be both an
agreement between nations, and also benefit individuals who can enforce that agreement).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. a; VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN
U.S. COURTS § 10:9 (3d ed. 2006).
44. Carlos Manuel Vfizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 695, 698 (1995) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Four Doctrines]; see also Quigley, supra note 7, at
554-56 (discussing the history of the Supremacy Clause, including the controversy over the
Treaty of Paris which sparked its adoption).
45. However, it does not appear that the United States learned much in the ensuing two
hundred years. Louis Henkin notes that the United States' habit of adopting treaties only with
reservations, like that it be non-self-executing, "has been described as specious, meretricious,
hypocritical." Henkin, Ghost, supra note 8, at 341.
46. Vfzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 698.
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plans.47 The New Jersey Plan contained a version of the Supremacy
Clause, and thus entrusted the enforcement of international (and
federal) law to the federal courts' judicial review of contrary state
law and action.48 On the other hand, the Virginia Plan entrusted
Congress with the power to negate state laws which contradicted or
violated the Constitution, federal or international law.49 The Framers
chose the New Jersey Plan. ° Consequently, "[t]o cure the defects of
the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution places treaties on par
with other constitutional provisions and federal law in their
supremacy over state law."'"
c. Early treaty jurisprudence
In accordance with the objective of the New Jersey Plan,
throughout the nineteenth century courts held that the Supremacy
Clause allows treaties to be interpreted as a source of affirmative
primary rights. 2 Therefore, if the treaty is a source of an affirmative
primary right, it is the court's natural role to enforce that primary
right. 3 In addition, treaty provisions are to be interpreted liberally,
5 4
47. Id. at 698-99. Compare id. at 697-700, with Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1983-
85.
48. Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 698-99.
49. Id. at 698.
50. Id. at 699 (arguing that "[t]he history of the Supremacy Clause thus shows that its
purpose was to avert violations of treaties attributable to the United States, and that the Founders
sought to accomplish this goal by making treaties enforceable in the courts at the behest of
affected individuals without the need for additional legislative action, either state or federal").
51. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1964. However, for purposes of this article, it should
be noted that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases invoking treaty-based rights.
52. Quigley, supra note 7, at 554-56 (discussing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796)). In contrast, Yoo notes that, "[t]o reach this conclusion, [one must] too hastily equate
'Law of the Land' with judicial enforceability. [Instead, b]oth the text of the Supremacy Clause
and its history indicate that its primary purpose was to guarantee the primacy of federal law over
state law." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1978. In fact, "[n]othing in the [Supremacy]
clause, however, indicates that supremacy was to be achieved automatically through the direct
enforceability of treaties in federal and state courts." Id. at 1979. For a definition of "primary
right," see infra note 114.
53. Quigley, supra note 7, at 555-56; Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1980-81. Yoo
notes that scholars who believe individuals must be able to enforce treaty rights in court rely on
the following additional sources of historical support: first, Alexander Hamilton's statement in
the Federalist No. 22; second, William Davie's statement at the North Carolina ratifying
convention. Id. For example, Hamilton said, "The treaties of the United States, to have any force
at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import as far as respects
individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations." Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 442 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986)).
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with "good faith"55 to foreclose friction between the parties to the
treaty. 6 Nevertheless, the constitutional and statutory constraints of
justiciability still apply. 7
d. Modern treaty jurisprudence
In the last fifty years there has been a shift in treaty
jurisprudence. 8  Scholars have noted that where "good faith"
interpretation had been a guidepost for courts throughout the early
years of the United States,59 at some point that liberal interpretative
principle died a "silent death."6 There has been no explanation for
the departure from this historical precedent.6' Scholars argue that
this reflects the change in the standing of the United States in the
international community since the second World War, and how the
U.S. construes its relations with the rest of the international
community.62 In addition, it has been suggested that judges may feel
Later, Yoo argues that this evidence "might refer to the judicial determination of the scope of
individual rights under a treaty... but they do not address whether individuals may bring actions
immediately upon the entry into force of a treaty or whether an implementing statute is required
first." Id. at 1981.
54. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:5.
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
325(1) (1987); Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1907 & n.161 ("Good faith in this most
basic sense is merely a reflection of the proposition that sovereign states must adhere to their
international commitments." (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331)).
56. Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1908-09 (citing The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) ("[E]mbrace the interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe
with the most scrupulous good faith, and which our Government could not violate without
disgrace, and which this Court could not disregard without betraying its duty.")).
57. See Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 699-700.
58. See infra notes 62-64 (discussing the possible reasons for this shift).
59. Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1913-14 ("[I]n nearly a dozen opinions in the
first half of the twentieth century, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the subject of the liberal
interpretative canon was substantive rights secured by treaties. Indeed, the Court embraced the
preference for an expansive interpretation of private rights with respect to treaties ranging from
commercial and property rights, to trademark protection, and even to taxation." (citations
omitted)).
60. Id. at 1914-16 (noting that the last time "good faith" was mentioned in a discussion of
treaty interpretation was seventy-five years ago, Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293
(1933), and that the liberal construction canon has been cited only once in the last forty years,
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989), receiving a resounding objection from Justice
Antonin Scalia); id. at 1916 (arguing that present reference to liberal interpretation has "very little
in common with its apparent antecedent").
61. Id.
62. See supra note 22.
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hesitant to limit states' rights "over and against the federal
government," although that is what the Framers arguably
contemplated by adopting the New Jersey Plan and its Supremacy
Clause over the Virginia Plan.63 Finally, and significantly, "[f]aw
schools do not focus on the Supremacy Clause's mention of treaties[]
in constitutional law courses. When a judge is told by an attorney
that the Supremacy Clause requires implementation of a treaty
provision, the judge may have no experience from which to assess
the argument."'
Whatever the reasons for this shift might be, the shift has
occurred. Now, courts generally focus on self-execution as the
threshold issue to determine whether a treaty-based primary right
may be enforced in court.65 But several different, and distinct, legal
issues hide within the concept of self-execution.
2. Self-Execution Analysis:
Proper Construction or Sneaky Abstention?
Courts in the United States must enforce the terms of a self-
executing treaty.66 It is binding international and domestic law.67 On
63. Quigley, supra note 7, at 580.
64. Id. In his blog, Roger Alford noted that at a recent event one "thoughtful, erudite"
federal appeals court judge confessed he was unaware of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a treaty outlining interpretative principles, that, to be fair, the United States has not
ratified. Posting of Roger Alford, Treaty Interpretation 101, to Opinio Juris (Oct. 17, 2006),
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/l160935000.shtml (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331). "To be sure, this judge is not to blame for the
widespread ignorance regarding the Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties]. His ignorance
is a by-product of a prevailing ignorance regarding the international rules of treaty interpretation."
Id. Indeed, "only one Supreme Court majority opinion" and two dissents reference the Vienna
Convention. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 2669, 2705 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
65. E.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 373 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the non-self-execution
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), was a "substantive threshold" to determining whether it
created enforceable obligations); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(correctly considering whether the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., 93d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (Dec. 10, 1984), was self-
executing before considering whether an individual could enforce its terms in a deportation
review proceeding).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(3) (1987) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to
international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-self-executing' agreement will
not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation."). Contra NANDA &
PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:9 (arguing the presumption in favor of non-self-execution is
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the other hand, if a treaty is non-self-executing,68 Congress must pass
implementing legislation before the terms of the treaty become
operable as domestic law.60 In that case, it is the implementing
legislation which is enforceable law, not the terms of the treaty
itself.7"
The doctrine of self-execution has come to occupy an important
place in the recent scholarly and jurisprudential debate about
treaties.7' Indeed, it has been called a "most confounding" issue in
misplaced). Two examples of self-executing treaties are the Vienna Convention, see infra note
215, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 53 Stat.
1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 307 (amended June 2, 1934).
67. E.g., Hague Convention, supra note 4; New York Convention, supra note 4.
68. Section 111, subsection 4 of the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
identifies three identifying characteristics of non-self-executing treaties: first, "if the agreement
manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of
implementing legislation"; second, "if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by
resolution, requires implementing legislation"; and third, "if implementing legislation is
constitutionally required." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 111(4).
69. Id. § Ill cmt. h. Contra Vd.zquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 697-700 (arguing
that including the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution marked the Framers' intentional
departure from British fundamental law, where all treaties were non-self-executing because
Parliament had the sole power to enact municipal laws). In addition, "[b]etween 1950 and
1955[,] Senator Bricker of Ohio led a movement to amend the Constitution" so that treaties were,
by definition, non-self-executing and could not legislate beyond Congress' Article II authority.
Henkin, Ghost, supra note 8, at 348. Motivated by a desire to prevent desegregation by
international treaty, Senator Bricker declared, "My purpose in offering this resolution [the Bricker
Amendment] is to bury the so-called Covenant on Human Rights so deep that no one holding
high public office will ever dare to attempt its resurrection." Id. at 349. While the amendment
was not passed, Bricker did achieve his goal: Eisenhower "promised that the United States would
not accede to international human rights covenants or conventions." Id. at 348-49 (citing
Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953) (statement of Secretary of State Dulles)). While "[s]uccessive
administrations slowly abandoned President Eisenhower's commitment.... Senator Bricker's
ghost has proved to be alive in the Senate, and successive administrations have become infected
with his ideology." Id. at 349.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
Il cmt. h.
71. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 8, at 348 ("The pattern of non-self-executing declarations
threatens to subvert the constitutional treaty system."); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing whether
attaching non-self-executing declarations to treaties is constitutional); Michael P. Van Alstine,
The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263 (2002) (responding to Yoo,
Globalism, supra note 18); Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18 (arguing that a more comprehensive
and systematic review of historical materials proves the Framers intended treaties to require
implementing legislation); David N. Cinotti, Note, The New Isolationism: Non-Self-Execution
Declarations and Treaties as the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277 (2003) (discussing
the history of the non-self-execution doctrine and its current impact on treaty-making).
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United States treaty interpretation.72 This is most likely because
recent jurisprudence has combined four different issues, each
analytically distinct, under the label "self-execution. '73  This article
will discuss each of the issues as they should be, distinct from one
another: first, whether the treaty was intended to be operable as
supreme domestic law without implementing legislation; 74 second,
whether the treaty creates judicially enforceable standards;75 third,
whether the treaty purports to accomplish a goal that is within the
exclusive law-making powers of Congress; 76 and fourth, whether an
individual may enforce the treaty in court.77 The focus of this article
is on this fourth issue, and, more specifically, on how an individual
may enforce a treaty-based right in federal court. However, the prior
three issues need to be summarily dealt with as a matter of
thoroughness.
a. The true self-execution question:
Divining intent
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, where the treaty terms do not expressly
state if it is intended to be self-executing, the United States decides
72. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
73. Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 710 (arguing that self-execution is simply a
question of intent, but that judges have conflated issues of justiciability and constitutionality with
it).
74. This is the classic self-execution question, and some argue that its answer depends on the
intent of the treaty-makers. Id. at 700-10.
75. Vdzquez dubbed this the "Justiciability Doctrine." Id. at 710-18.
76. This is the "Constitutionality Doctrine." Id. at 718-19. According to the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, "[a]n international agreement cannot
take effect as domestic law without implementation by Congress if the agreement would achieve
what lies within the exclusive law-making power of Congress ..." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. i (1987). For example, a treaty
may be unconstitutional if it attempts to invoke Congress' spending power, make a declaration of
war, or raise revenue via taxation. Id. This also invokes separation of powers issues as between
the legislature and the treaty makers of the Executive Branch. V~zquez, Four Doctrines, supra
note 44, at 718; see also, e.g., Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding a treaty provision preventing foreign taxpayers from paying double income tax in France
and the United States unconstitutional because it inflringed on Congress' exclusive powers).
77. This is the "Private Right of Action Doctrine." Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44,
at 718-22. Indeed, another scholar noted, "[s]ome courts ... have erroneously defined self-
executing treaties to include only those that create affirmative private rights of action." Van
Alstine, Age of Treaties, supra note 3, at 919 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th
Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)). But see, e.g., id. at 919 n. 156 (citing Int'l Cafe, S.A.L.
v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.5 (11 th Cir. 2001) (per curiam));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § Ill cmt. h.
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"how it will carry out its international obligations. Accordingly, the
intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to
be self-executing. . . ."" However, the Restatement does not
definitely declare whose intent counts:79 that of the parties to the
treaty, or one of the "treaty-makers" of the United States? If the
parties to the treaty intend the treaty to be self-executing,
independent of implementing legislation, there is a real risk of
international friction if the United States declares differently after
agreeing to the treaty's terms."0 On the other hand, if the parties to
the treaty intend that the treaty, or a particular provision of it, be non-
self-executing, then the threat of international friction is abated."1
Each party is "on notice" that the treaty must be implemented by
each parties' legislative organizations before becoming effective
domestic law. 2
The President and, by delegation, the United States State
Department, are generally considered the "treaty-makers" of the
United States. They negotiate the treaty terms before sending the
treaty to the Senate for its "advice and consent" to ratification. 3
However, in its "advice and consent" role, the Senate may change
how the treaty is enforced domestically. 4 For example, in 1992 the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations expressed
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. h; see also Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1972 ("Such efforts [to divine intent] seem
to indicate that courts are attempting to incorporate treaties into their conceptual frameworks for
deciding constitutional and statutory questions. This is nowhere more clear than in the current
refinement of the intent-based approach into a private cause-of-action analysis."). Contra
NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:9, 10-57 (arguing that it is "somewhat inappropriate" for
the Restatement to accept a presumption of non-self-execution where the intent of the United
States regarding that issues is "unclear"); Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 707-08
(arguing that this practice is "in some tension with the text and apparent purposes of the
Supremacy Clause").
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
326 n.2; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:5.
80. Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 706.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. For a treaty to be enforceable domestic law, two-thirds of the Senate must "consent" to
the treaty. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:4, 10-20. As Nanda notes, "We often refer to
this consent as Senate 'ratification' of the treaty. Technically, however, the Senate advises and
consents and upon the required consent the President ratifies the treaty." Id. However, "[i]n an
international sense," Senate consent is not required for a treaty to be binding international law.
Id. at 21.
84. Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2005); NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note
43, § 10:4, 10-23 n.23.
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their "advice and consent" to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") "subject to the following declarations: (1)
That the United States declares that the provisions ... [of the
ICCPR] are not self-executing."85
As such, "[f]ower courts in recent years, however, have sought
to discern the intent not of the parties to the treaty, but of the U.S.
negotiators of the treaty, the President in transmitting it to the Senate
for its advice and consent, and the Senate in giving its advice and
consent. 8 6 By doing so, the courts analyze the treaty's negotiations
and statements made during and after the ratification process.8 7
In some instances, this extra-textual analysis overcomes the
treaty's plain language.88  This interpretative method directly
contradicts the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.89 That
agreement, while not ratified by the United States, is still considered
to be a binding restatement of customary international law.9" It
directs courts to look at the plain language of the treaty before
divining intent to determine whether a particular provision is self-
executing.9' That is, courts are to look for language in the treaty
indicating it was intended to be unenforceable without implementing
legislation.92
85. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 102-23, at 23 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
645,659.
86. Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 705.
87. Id. at 705 n.47 (citing, among others, Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
761 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985)); Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1972.
88. Vfzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 705 n.47 (citing various cases where this has
been done as a matter of course).
89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1979, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT]. This treaty has not been ratified by the United States, however. See infra
note 90 and accompanying text.
90. Robert E. Dalton, National Treaty Law and Practice: United States, in 2 NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: AUSTRIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED
STATES 240, 240 n.2 (Monroe Leigh, Merritt R. Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington eds. 1999)
("Although not yet in force, the Convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative
guide to current treaty law and practice.").
91. VCLT, supra note 89, art. 2(l)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333.
92. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373) ("As
we noted [in Frolova], if the parties' intent is clear from the treaty's language, courts will not
inquire into the remaining factors."); NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:9 (making
arguments in favor of presuming treaties to be self-executing). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. d (1987) (seemingly
adopting as valid the unilateral reliance on Senate qualifications when determining whether a
treaty is self-executing).
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It is preferable for a treaty to be self-executing because it lowers
the risk of involuntary breach.93 In fact, reporter's note 5 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States notes, "if the Executive Branch has not requested
implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such
legislation, there is a strong presumption that the treaty has been
considered self-executing by the political branches, and should be
considered self-executing by the courts."94
Instead, recent jurisprudence presumes treaties are non-self-
executing, then searches for intent that the treaty create enforceable
standards without implementing legislation.95 Scholars who believe
the Supremacy Clause was adopted to shift the United States away
from the British system, where treaties could not be self-executing
because only Parliament has the ability to create municipal law,
believe the courts' search for intent before textual analysis is
misguided.96
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 n.5; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:9, 10-58 ("If the agreement is presented [by the
President] as a treaty,... further interpretation of its 'possible' self-executing character frustrates
the international process. To further impose the need for a self-executing finding permits the
branches of government to put their heads in the sand and ignore their international promises.").
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 n.5; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:9, 10-62 (noting that while "[tihe Restatement
works within the existing legal framework[,] ... the Restatement's approach is too passive");
Vfzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 705 (voicing concern that the lower courts have
reversed the presumption in favor of non-self-execution).
95. E.g., Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 207 n.I, 208 (4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J.,
dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 11 (4)(a)); United States v. Emuegbunam, 2001 FED. App. 0358P at 10 (6th Cir. 2001)
("[Clourts presume that the rights created by an international treaty belong to a state and that a
private individual cannot enforce them."); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
[A] few courts have looked not for an intent to alter the rule that treaties do not
generally require legislative implementation to be enforceable by the courts of this
country, but for an intent that the treaty be enforceable in the courts, and, in the
absence of evidence of such an intent, they have held that the relevant treaty is not
'self-executing' and thus not enforceable by the courts of this country.
Vd.zquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 705. See id. at 705 n.47 for a more exhaustive list of
cases where this has been done. Contra Igartua-Dc La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 189
(1 st Cir. 2005) ("Given this constitutional and judicial history, a court ought not quickly conclude
that treaties are non-self-executing. Rather, a court must conduct an independent and searching
inquiry into the treaty's purpose." (citation omitted)).
96. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
202 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that this practice of divining intent has been "accepted without
significant discussion, is 'anti-Constitutional' in spirit and highly problematic as a matter of law"
because it "runs counter to the language, and spirit, and history of the Constitution"); NANDA &
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Regardless of which approach ultimately wins the day by
declaration or default, the intent of the parties to the treaty and the
President, the Senate, and the Executive Branch are relevant when
determining whether a treaty is enforceable without implementing
legislation.97 However, questions about whether and how the treaty
should be able to be invoked in court should be answered
separately.9"
b. Changing the analysis:
Conflating justiciability issues with self-execution
Some of the confusion surrounding enforcing treaties in court is
due to the lack of clear, definite boundaries between analytical
issues. Courts conflate valid questions of justiciability with the
rubric of self-execution.99 As stated above, self-execution is a matter
of determining whether the treaty-makers intended to implement a
treaty with legislation before making it enforceable domestically.'
On the other hand, a court properly considers whether the case before
it is justiciable when it asks the following types of questions: would
ruling on the case interfere with separation of powers? Are the right
parties before the court? Do the parties have a case or controversy?
Has the applicable law created judicially manageable standards by
PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:9, 10-64 (arguing to remove any "presumption" in favor of a
straightforward principle--"a treaty is self-executing absent express provision to the contrary");
Vfzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 706. But see Yoo, Globalism, supra note 18, at 1961
(arguing that the "[i]ntemationalists [as he calls Vfzquez and his followers] have neglected both
to review the Framing-era sources carefully enough and to utilize a systematic methodology").
97. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REv. 65, 112 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court considered, then
rejected, the Executive Branch's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, thus indicating that
the Court has the power to require more formal determinations of a treaty's meaning before
deferring to the President's "short-term, politically motivated decisions that do not redound to the
long-term interests of America").
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. h; see also Li, 206 F.3d at 68 (Sleya, J. and Boudin, J., concurring) (adopting the
Restatement's position).
99. VAzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 711 ("A review of the decisions that ascribe
independent significance to factors other than intent shows that these courts have examined under
the 'self-execution' rubric various concepts that are not unique to treaties. These include matters
such as whether the claim is justiciable, whether the litigant has standing, and whether the litigant
has a right of action. Rather than examine these issues separately as they (generally) do in
constitutional and statutory cases, courts confronted with treaties have rolled all of these issues
into a single 'self-execution' question.").
100. See supra Part B.2.a.
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which the court can accurately assess the parties' behavior?'0 1
Answering these questions allows the court to determine if it has the
power to hear that particular case. For example, while it is accurate
to conclude that if a treaty does not dictate judicially enforceable
standards, courts cannot enforce its terms as domestic law,0 2 it is
inaccurate to make the next theoretical leap: that the treaty is non-
self-executing. Clearly, issues relating to justiciability are different
than whether the treaty is self-executing. Even so, courts often
conflate these issues.1
0 3
It is especially important that the court clearly distinguish
between the two issues, self-execution and justiciability, because a
determination that a particular treaty provision is nonjusticiable will
affect all other treaty provisions similar to it.04 On the other hand, if
a court determines that a particular treaty provision is non-self-
executing and therefore unenforceable in a court of law, that
determination will not affect other similar treaty provisions because
the intent assessment is made on a case-by-case basis. 05
C. Introduction to Treaty Provisions Which
Benefit Individuals
Traditionally, treaties were considered contracts between
nations,0 6 dealing with foreign relations issues, and enforceable only
by other signatory nations. This seemed proper and logical given the
national character of the agreements.
101. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 158 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A]s a practical
matter, it is impossible for courts to discern or apply in any rigorous, systematic, or legal manner
international pronouncements that promote amorphous, general principles." (citing Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999))). For examples where this question
has been answered in the negative, see V~zquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 713-14
nn.81-85 (citing several cases where courts have declined to enforce treaty provisions because it
was "too vague for judicial enforcement" or failed to "provide[] specific standards").
102. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
103. United States v. Kun Yun Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d 618, 632 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that
the district court did not decide whether the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") was self-executing because it "found no specific right of private action in
UNCLOS that would provide an individual litigant redress under UNCLOS"); Stutts v. De
Dietrich Group, No. 03-CV-4058 (ILG), 2006 WL 1867060, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006)
(defining "self-executing" as where "a private right of action is explicitly provided for in the
treaty or the treaty has been implemented by a U.S. federal statute").
104. Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 717 n. 102.
105. Id.
106. Van Alstine, Age of Treaties, supra note 3, at 904.
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Now, however, treaties are being used to govern individuals and
previously domestic issues."°7 Indeed, some provisions of recent
treaties have been written in such a way as to arguably confer a
primary right upon an individual." 8 For example, the Hague
Convention governs international child abductions and the Vienna
Convention governs when foreign detainees must be informed of
their right to contact their consulate. Accordingly, treaties will be
increasingly litigated by individuals seeking to enforce their terms
against other private individuals and against state officials.
There are four distinct issues which one must address when
pleading a case: first, whether the treaty bestows upon the plaintiff a
primary right;0 9 second, whether the treaty itself contains a
secondary right, or right of action;" ' alternatively, whether the treaty-
based primary right may be enforced by another right of action;'
third, whether the treaty or other federal law provides a remedy;" 2
and fourth, whether federal court is the proper place to adjudicate
this claim.' 3
1. Interpretation of Primary Rights:
Using the Standing Doctrine
The first issue is whether the plaintiff has a right to be treated in
a certain fashion by the defendant. This is often qualified in terms of
a "primary right" or "standing.""' "Primary rules in municipal legal
systems are those under which 'human beings are required to do or
abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not.""'
5
107. See supra notes 2-4, 26-28 for examples of these types of treaties.
108. See infra Parts D.2.a.i.A, D.2.a.ii.A, D.2.b.ii.A.
109. See infra Part C. 1. For a definition of "primary right," see infra text accompanying note
115.
110. See infra Part C.2.
111. See id.
112. See infra Part C.3.
113. See infra Part D.
114. Traditionally, an individual plaintiff has standing when the constitutional provision or
statute was "intended to benefit" the individual plaintiff. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra
note 1, at 1135-36 (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990)) (arguing
that the question of whether an individual plaintiff has a primary right under a treaty and whether
an individual has standing "in fact address the same issue and should be collapsed"). This
argument was cited with approval in Standt v. New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
115. Vdizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1089 (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 78-79 (1961)).
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Simply, a litigant has standing if under the law they have a primary
right to be treated in a certain fashion and the defendant is alleged to
have breached that primary right."6
Some treaties set forth aspirations, rather than obligations."
7
Since by their terms they are not attempting to bind the parties to a
particular set of obligations, there is no obligatory standard which
can be breached. Therefore, the courts cannot enforce these terms."'
116. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 883; Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1135-37 (noting
that because constitutional and statutory standing doctrines are relatively recent legal
developments "it is not surprising that these decisions do not connect the issues of primary rights
and standing").
117. The following international agreements are often cited as aspirational, rather than
obligatory: Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360; Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 14, 1992, Principle 1, 31 I.L.M. 874. In addition, until
recently, so-called "common article 3" of the Geneva Conventions was considered non-self-
executing, and therefore beyond the scope of judicial enforcement. Then, the Supreme Court
decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), and determined that Article 21 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, whose authority relied upon the law of war, "executed" the
prisoners' rights created by common article 3. Id. at 2793-95. Accordingly, common article 3, at
least, was judicially enforceable. Marcia Coyle, 'Hamdan "Links U.S., International Law: Reach
of Ruling Already in Dispute, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 2006, at 1; see also David Scheffer, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: The Supreme Court Affirms International Law, JURIST, June 30, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/06/hamdan-v-rumsfeld-supreme-court.php. At least as
significantly, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the principles embodied in
common article 3 applied to armed conflicts even if the not all the participants were signatories to
the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96; see also Post of Kenneth Anderson,
Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and Common Article 3, to Kenneth Anderson's Law of War
and Just War Theory Blog (July 12, 2006, 10:09 EST), http://kennethandersonlawofwar.
blogspot.com/2006/07/hamdan-geneva-conventions-and-common.html (arguing that the Court's
decision on this point means that common article 3 will be the only Geneva Convention
protection embodied applicable to detainees in the War on Terror). In response to the Court's
unprecedented "power grab" in Hamdan, President Bush proposed a series of bills in an attempt
to gain Congress' consent to create the military commissions the Court had just invalidated as
unconstitutional. John Yoo, Sending a Message: Congress to Courts: "Get Out of the War on
Terror, " OPINIONJOURNAL, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.opinionjoumal.com/editorial
/feature.html?id= 110009113. On September 29, 2006, Congress passed Senate Bill 3930, a
compromise bill. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Why the Military Commissions Act is No
Moderate Compromise, FINDLAW, Oct. 11, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf
/20061011.html; Aziz Huq, How The Military Commissions Act of 2006 Threatens Judicial
Independence: Attempting to Keep the Courts Out of the Business of Geneva Conventions
Enforcement, FINDLAW, Sept. 26, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060926
_huq.html. President Bush signed the MCA into law on October 17, 2006. George W. Bush,
President of the United States, Address at the Military Commissions Act Signing Ceremony (Oct.
17, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-l .html.
118. One reason for this might lie within the separation of powers realm. Asking a court to
enforce what amount to political aspirations would intrude on the legislative branch's mandate to
create the rules by which society must live. V~izquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 44, at 718.
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Indeed, if a litigant used one of these treaties as the basis of his or her
claim, he or she would lose on the merits." 9
Furthermore, a treaty that establishes a primary right benefiting
an individual may be enforced by the individual if there is a
secondary right: a right of action which allows that individual to
initiate a judicial proceeding on his behalf.'2' There is a definite
difference between determining that a treaty provision benefits an
individual thereby conferring a primary right, as is required by the
constitutional doctrine of standing,'2' and determining that the
benefited individual may initiate a judicial proceeding to enforce that
primary right against the entity that breached it.'
22
2. Interpretation of Secondary Rights:
Preventing Enforcement of Treaty-Based Rights
by Finding No Treaty-Based Private Cause of Action
The second issue is whether the plaintiff may initiate a judicial
proceeding to enforce his or her primary right vis a vis the defendant.
This issue may be qualified as whether your client has a "secondary
right,"'' 23 a "private cause of action," or a "private right of action.'
' 24
119. Id. at 712.
120. But beware of generalized grievances. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289-
91 (2001) (holding that plaintiff had no standing to enforce disparate impact discrimination). In
addition, some treaty provisions are intended to benefit only state actors, not individuals. For
example, it is very unlikely that an individual could enforce the terms of a disarmament treaty,
Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1140 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-
56 (1984)), or land grant treaties which protect all property rights, 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3563 n.46
(2d ed. 1984) (citing Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 F. 148
(C.C.D. Cal. 1896)). In addition, beware of forum non conveniens when dealing with foreign
litigants adjudicating disputes arising in foreign jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987).
121. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1134-36, 1141.
122. Id. at 1141 n.242. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court distinguished
the concepts as follows:
[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to
create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on
federal-court jurisdiction; cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff
is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke
the power of the court; and relief is a question of the various remedies a federal court
may make available.
Id. at 239.
123. "A secondary or remedial right is ... a right to obtain a remedy or sanction upon the
violation of a primary right .. " Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1089-90
(citing Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 515-16 (1924)).
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Generally, it is easy to conflate whether a constitution, treaty, or
statute contains a private primary right with whether it bestows
secondary rights (i.e., rights of action) for the simple reason that
most courts talk about "rights" rather indefinitely, without clarifying
adjectives. 125  In fact, primary rights and secondary rights are two
very different "legal animals.
126
While courts generally find that treaties bestow primary rights
on individuals, at the same time they prevent those rights from being
enforced by determining that those individuals have no treaty-based
right of action.'27 Accordingly, although a treaty benefits individuals,
that individual may not be able to enforce that treaty's obligation in
court.2 ' On the other hand, the individual who wishes to invoke a
treaty right defensively does not need a private right of action, only a
primary right.'29
However, treaty-based primary rights are enforceable using
existing federally created causes of action. Consequently, the claims
can be adjudicated in federal court because the causes of action are
124. For purposes of this paper, I will use the phrases "private cause of action" and "private
fight of action" interchangeably.
125. See id. at 1087-88 (arguing that the use of the general term "right" when stating that
individuals do or do not have "fights" under international law is "susceptible" to both
interpretations-as primary rights or secondary fights).
126. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 153 (tent. ed. 1958) (calling a secondary, or remedial,
fight of action a "very different legal animal" than a primary right).
127. Oftentimes, the courts determine a treaty is unenforceable because the terms neither
contain nor create a private fight of action, qualifying the treaty as "non-self-executing." As
discussed supra text accompanying notes 125-126, this characterization is not technically
accurate.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 n.4 (1987).
129. Quigley, supra note 7, at 577; Van Alstine, Age of Treaties, supra note 3, at 918 (citing
Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts-Jurisdictional
Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped
Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1448-63 (1996)). However, the well-
pleaded complaint rule, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987), will prevent cases
which cite treaty-based rights defensively from getting into federal court. See Quigley, supra
note 7, at 577. On the other hand, some treaties' implementing legislation has explicitly
abrogated the well-pleaded complaint rule. Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano v. Consalvi Int'l
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392) (discussing
the differences between 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) and 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970), one of the
implementing provisions of the New York Convention, supra note 4). For a more detailed
discussion of this difference, see infra D.2.b.ii.D.
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federally created and general federal question jurisdiction exists
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.13°
Depending on the parties, it may be fairly straightforward to
plead a case in federal court, even when alleging a violation of a
treaty-based right. Leaving aside the interpretative issue of whether
a secondary right exists from the terms of the treaty, the following
outlines the straightforward avenues into federal court. All of these
turn on who the plaintiff or defendant is and assume the existence of
a treaty-based primary right.'3'
a. Suing federal and state officials
for violating treaty-based rights
If the treaty itself creates a primary right so that the plaintiff has
standing, the plaintiff may sue a state or federal domestic official
using 42 U.S.C. § 1983,132 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,' respectively, as the federally
created rights of action.3 4 In addition, the plaintiff may sue a federal
agency for breaching her primary right using the provisions of the
APA.'35 Accordingly, when the plaintiff can allege within the
confines of her well-pleaded complaint that her treaty-based right has
been violated by a state or federal official,'36 the plaintiff may file her
130. See infra Part C.2.a.
13 1. Other threshold questions include: whether the parties' countries of origin have ratified
the treaty; whether the treaty is self-executing, see supra Part B.2, and if not self-executing,
whether the treaty has been implemented. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)).
133. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying a private right of action to enforce the Fifth Amendment).
134. Both are valid options, although § 1983 is an express private right of action, whereas
Bivens implied a private right of action in the Fifth Amendment.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof"); see, e.g., Sohappy v. Hodel, 911 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th
Cir. 1990); Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191-94 (7th Cir. 1984); Vizquez, Treaty-Based
Rights, supra note 1, 1143-54 ("In short, in suits against state and federal officials, a right of
action is afforded by section 1983 and the APA, respectively, to any person holding a primary
right under a treaty unless either a treaty or a statute makes other procedures exclusive or
affirmatively precludes review.").
136. See, e.g., Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1991); Standt, 153 F.
Supp. 2d at 427-30 (finding that Article 36 of the VCCR creates a primary right which an alien
could enforce against city and state police officers using 28 U.S.C. § 1983 or 28 U.S.C. § 1350);
Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1269, 1272 & n.28 (1991). If the litigant wishes to sue a foreign official or
government, sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine must be overcome. These issues
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case in federal court under the express terms of Article III of the
United States Constitution137 and the implementing statute of that
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.138
b. Suing corporations or private individuals
for violating treaty-based rights
If the plaintiffs treaty-based rights have been violated by a
private individual, the federal causes of action found in 42 U.S.C. §
1983, Bivens, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") are
unavailable. 39 In that case, the plaintiff should first argue the treaty
itself contains a private right of action. Unfortunately, however,
treaties rarely contain express rights of action. As such, this trail
focuses on the issue of how private rights of action are implied from
the express terms of treaties,141 using the analysis usually applied to
statutory-based implied causes of action.'
4'
The Supreme Court is less willing to imply a right of action
from a federal statute because it is a violation of separation of
powers. 42  Until 1975, when the Supreme Court decided Cort v.
are beyond the scope of this article. See generally Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Co., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), which considered the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity created
under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480 (1983), where the Supreme Court concluded the FSIA was a comprehensive federal
scheme governing foreign sovereign immunity, and so it was proper to allow FSIA suits based
wholly on common law causes of action into federal court, and Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), which considered the limits of the act of state doctrine.
137. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2(1) ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority .... ).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1875) (amended 1980) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.").
139. See supra Part C.2.a.
140. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1155 ("If... no common-law action is
available, it is necessary to consider whether a right of action is nevertheless implicit in the
treaty.").
141. Vzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1114 ("The rules specifying whether and
when constitutional and statutory adjudication is appropriate, and at whose behest, are no less
applicable to treaty adjudication."). Even so, it is not clear that the same modes of analysis should
be used to interpret statutes and treaties. See Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1923 ("In
sharp contrast to statutes... the application of treaties involves interpreting the obligations owed
to a sovereign entity that is external to our national polity.").
142. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Vd.zquez, Treaty-Based
Rights, supra note 1, at 1155.
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Ash, "'43 courts generally implied a right of action if a statute conferred
a primary right and there was no indication of legislative intent to
make other enforcement mechanisms exclusive. 44  Now, however,
the focus has shifted to whether Congress affirmatively intended a
private right of action to exist. 145 Moreover, "[a]lthough the Court
has not, since Cort, addressed the proper test for implying rights of
action from treaties, several factors militate in favor of employing a
third approach, more closely resembling the approach the Court
applies today with respect to constitutional claims,' '1 46 because
"treaties resemble the Constitution far more closely than statutes. ' 47
However, one scholar argues that courts should nonetheless
apply a less restrictive analysis to treaties, one more akin to how the
Court has interpreted constitutional provisions.14 According to this
argument, courts should not presume that their provisions were
intended to be enforced elsewhere because treaties have more
complicated and less accessible enforcement mechanisms, as
evidenced by the length of this article. 49 Now, however, similar to
the change in statutory analysis, the focus has shifted to whether the
treaty makers (the President and Senate) intended the treaty to be
enforced by individuals in court. 5 °
The particular issue of whether a treaty can be interpreted to
contain an implied private right of action has had special significance
since Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson.'' While
there was considerable disagreement among the federal circuits'52 as
to whether the lack of a federal private right of action doomed a
143. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
144. See Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 578; VAzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at
1155. In addition, these comprehensive statutory schemes usually provide alternative
enforcement mechanisms, like administrative review.
145. Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 578.
146. Vfizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1155-56.
147. Id. at 1156. Contra Van Alstine, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 1923.
148. Vhzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1155 ("With respect to constitutional
claims, however, the Court has adhered to its comparatively hospitable, pre-Cort approach to
implying rights of action.").
149. Id. at 1156 ("[T]he Court's continuing hospitable approach to implying rights of action
under the Constitution is based in part on the intent of the Framers to make the courts the primary
enforcers of constitutional rights .... [T]he Framers had a similar intent with respect to treaties."
(citations omitted)).
150. See supra notes 16-19.
151. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
152. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,311-12 (2005).
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litigant's attempt to adjudicate a state law cause of action in federal
court after Merrell Dow,'53 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing54 has resolved this issue
somewhat. In the latter case, the Supreme Court held that the lack of
a private right of action is "relevant to, but not dispositive" of
Congress' intent as to whether a state law claim supported by a
particular federal law was to be allowed into federal court.'55
Therefore, a lack of a federally created private right of action does
not torpedo a litigant's attempt to plead a state law created cause of
action in federal court.'56 In fact, Grable reaffirmed the true test:
"[T]he question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."'57
If the litigant is able to show that the treaty itself contains an
implied right of action, then federal subject matter jurisdiction is
appropriate, again, because of the express language of Article III and
28 U.S.C. § 1331.158 In addition, if it is an alien who is asserting the
claim, and the violation amounts to a tort, then 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), applies and federal subject matter
jurisdiction is appropriate.
59
But, where the treaty provides a primary right, with no
corresponding implied secondary right, the litigant may still try to
follow a faint trail into federal court. Treaty rights have a long
history of being incorporated into common law causes of action. 6 '
However, these common law rights of action are normally
adjudicated by state courts. 6' But where the plaintiff would be best
153. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
154. 545 U.S. at 308.
155. Id. at 318.
156. Id.
157. Id. at314.
158. See supra notes 137-38.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
160. Henkin, Ghost, supra note 8, at 347 n.29 ("[C]ourts can enforce self-executing human
rights provisions by injunction and commonly also by common law remedies."); Vdzquez,
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1143.
161. Language like this certainly did not help give the lower federal courts clear guidance on
which claims were and were not to be adjudicated in federal courts: "Given the significance of the
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served by adjudicating his or her case in federal court, 6 2 the plaintiff
will have to argue that the face of his or her well-pleaded complaint
contains a disputed, substantial, and essential federal issue: the
construction of the treaty-based right.'63 This theory is discussed in
more detail in Part IV(B)(2)(a), infra.
3. Remedies for Treaty Violations
Third, the plaintiff must be entitled to a judicial remedy under
the law which can redress his or her injury. When determining if a
treaty creates a right of action, courts often consider whether the
treaty clearly elucidates a remedy for violation of the alleged right."6
Moreover, this inquiry is an appropriate one for courts to make given
that a remedy is required for Article III standing to exist.'65
However, this issue is easily conflated with whether your client
has a private right of action to enforce her primary right because of
the well-known adage, "that every right... must have a remedy."' 66
assumed congressional determination to preclude federal private remedies [for violating the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act], the presence of the federal issue as an element of the
state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes
and the federal system." Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986).
162. One scholar has argued that plaintiffs in human rights and environmental litigation
against multinational corporations may not be better off in federal court. Rosencranz &
Campbell, supra note 7, at 205-06. State standing requirements are less strict than federal
because state courts are not limited to Article III cases and controversies. Id. at 190. Therefore,
litigants may not have to have the injured parties personally participate throughout the trial. Id. at
190-91. In addition, state courts do not have to consider the following two doctrines which give
federal judges "convenient rationales for dismissing the case[s]": first, the act of state doctrine,
which "generally precludes review by United States courts of official acts by foreign states," id. at
197 (citing Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envt'l Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)), and
second, comity, a principle which discourages one state from punishing conduct with the intent of
changing behavior in another state. Id. at 179 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 571 (1996)). Finally, the federal forum non conveniens factors elucidated in Piper Aircraft
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) also create a formidable barrier for a foreign litigant
suing for an injury sustained in a foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 179-87. However, some states have
legislatively adopted the Piper standards "to avoid being flooded by 'foreign litigation."' Id. at
188.
163. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. As such, the Supremacy
Clause places treaties and federal statutory law on essentially the same foundation. Van Alstine,
Good Faith, supra note 14, at 1893.
164. E.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005); see also infra notes 211-12
and accompanying text.
165. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979).
166. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803); see also VAzquez, Treaty-
Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1090 (noting that the traditional view that international law does
not provide "rights" to individuals "reflects the sanctionist view of law, under which the existence
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While some courts do discuss these issues in the same breath, for
clarity it is important to maintain analytical distinctions between the
two ideas. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court stated in
Davis v. Passman, "[a] plaintiff may have a cause of action even
through he be entitled to no relief at all, as, for example, when a
plaintiff sues for declaratory or injunctive relief although his case
does not fulfill the 'preconditions' for such equitable remedies."' 67
For further discussion of remedies available under particular
treaties, see infra Parts IV(B)(l)(a)(iii), IV(B)(1)(b)(iii) and
IV(B)(Z)(b)(iii).
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Finally, the fourth issue is that the plaintiff must plead his or her
case in the proper court-the court which has the expertise and
ability to adjudicate his or her case. This is the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 6 ' and
determining whether a particular claim may be adjudicated in federal
court is a question which has confused legal scholars and law
students since the seminal case, Osborn v. Bank of the United
States.'69 On the other hand, state courts retain the right to adjudicate
all claims which federal courts may not. Consequently, if the federal
court dismisses your client's claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, 7 ° the remedy is simply to file the claim in the
appropriate state court.' 7' However, there are real practical reasons
for wanting to adjudicate one's case in federal court. 72 For example,
of a right turns on the power of the right-holder to set in motion on his own behalf the machinery
of the legal system for enforcing obligations and sanctioning departures from them"). Contra id.
at 1091 (citing HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27-29
(1973)). One example of a court that has seemed to collapse the two issues, right of action and
remedy, is Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
167. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18 (citing Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-43 (1977)).
168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.")
169. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
171. Barring, of course, any statute of limitations problems.
172. The "[p]rincipal purpose of the grant of original federal question jurisdiction is to afford
plaintiffs a sympathetic and knowledgeable forum for the vindication of their federal rights." 13B
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 120, § 3561 n.5 (citing Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746
F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984)). But see supra note 162.
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federal courts may be more likely to interpret federal law uniformly
and correctly because of their experience with that body of law. 173 In
addition, it was traditionally feared that state courts would be more
hostile to the adjudication of federal interests.
17 4
1. Article III
According to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, "[t]he judicial
Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases ... arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."'75 Clearly, the
interpretation of treaties is a matter for the federal courts. However,
like a self-executing treaty, this constitutional provision was not
implemented until 1875, when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331.176
Moreover, constitutional subject matter jurisdiction, which derives
its authorization from Article III, has always been interpreted much
more broadly than statutory subject matter jurisdiction, which
derives its authority from § 1331.17
According to Wright, Miller and Cooper, "The most difficult
single problem in determining whether federal question jurisdiction
exists is deciding when the relation of federal law to a case is such
that the action may be said to be one 'arising under' that law."'
' 78
Furthermore, they note that "it cannot be said that any clear test has
yet been developed to determine which cases 'arise under' federal
law. There is no single rationalizing principle that will explain all of
173. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826-27 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981));
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
174. Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 826-27 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
176. Akhil Reed Amar, Article, A Neo-Federalist View of Article II1: Separating Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 265 (1985).
177. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983) ("Although the
language of § 1331 parallels that of the 'Arising Under' Clause of Art. II, this Court never has
held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction.
Quite the contrary is true. Section 1331, the general federal-question statute, although broadly
phrased, 'has been continuously construed and limited in the light of the history that produced it,
the demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy which have
emerged from the [statute's] function as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation.
It is a statute, not a Constitution, we are expounding."') (quoting Romero v. Int'l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)).
178. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 120, § 3562.
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the decisions on this point."'' 9 Nonetheless, it is well settled that
Article III requires a "case or controversy" for proper subject matter
jurisdiction. 8 That is, the outcome of the case must "rise or fall" on
the construction of the federal issue."' In addition, the claim must
contain a "potential" federal issue for there to be proper
constitutional subject matter jurisdiction. 2
2. Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
28 U.S.C. § 1331
a. Creation test: Examples of
implied and express rights of action
According to Justice Holmes' "Creation Test," "[a] case arises
under federal law if and only if federal law creates the plaintiffs
cause of action."'' 3 Therefore, if a private right of action is implied
from the terms of a treaty, federal question jurisdiction necessarily
exists.14
i. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
Jogi v. Voges: An example of a treaty
with an implied private right of action
In 1963, ninety-two nations codified existing customary
international law on consular relations by adopting the Vienna
179. Id.
180. This is to prevent the courts from rendering advisory opinions and protects the courts
from working outside the adversarial process-something courts are not good at. Standing is
always a key element of the case or controversy requirement. Georgene M. Vairo, Selected
Problems in Federal Jurisdiction: Standing, Implied Rights of Action Pendent Jurisdiction, and
Abstention, in 1 TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 363, 365 (ALI-ABA ed., 1991).
181. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824). Contra sources cited
infra note 167.
182. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824.
183. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 290
(Aspen Law & Business 2003) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court applied Holmes's Creation Test
in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)").
184. See supra Part C.2. for a discussion of when private rights of action are implied.
However, Wright, Miller and Cooper note that "[t]he extension of federal question jurisdiction to
treaties is of limited significance because it is rare that the relation of a treaty to the plaintiffs
claim will be sufficiently direct to satisfy the test of 'arising under."' 13B WRIGHT, MILLER &




Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR").18 5  However, the
United States did not ratify this treaty until 1969 because of worries
that the treaty only codified minimum standards.'86 But, once
ratified, the VCCR was determined to be self-executing.17  That is,
the VCCR was enforceable law without implementing legislation.
(A). Primary right
One provision of the VCCR, article 36, has created a flurry of
litigation since its ratification. The article generally governs the
communication between consuls and the foreign nationals of his
country. While many courts and commentators have argued that the
Preamble to the treaty restricts its applicability to consular relations,
others have successfully argued that article 36 confers a primary
right upon foreign nationals to be in contact with their consulate
when arrested or detained in a foreign, signatory country.
88
Specifically, article 36(1)(b) requires arresting authorities to inform
the individual foreign national of "his right" to contact his consulate
in order to obtain assistance and counsel.'89 It goes on to impose a
185. VCCR, supra note 2.
186. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 568-69 (1997).
187. Standt v. New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 423 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Breard v.
Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring)); S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app.,
at 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State) (noting
that the United States considers the VCCR to be "entirely self-executive").
188. Most courts have assumed without deciding that the VCCR confers primary rights upon
individuals. E.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); United States v. Emuegbunam,
268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001). For a more thorough discussion of the VCCR, see NANDA &
PANSIUS, supra note 43, § 10:10; Emily Deck Harrill, Exorcising the Ghost: Finding a Right and
a Remedy in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 55 S.C. L. REV. 569
(2004); Vdizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1; Kadish, supra note 186, at 594; Quigley,
supra note 7, at 561-70; David Sweis, The Availability of Damages to Foreign Nationals for
Violation of the Consular Relations Treaty, 19 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 63 (2006); Kweku Vanderpuye
& Robert W. Bigelow, The Vienna Convention and the Defense of Noncitizens in New York: A
Matter of Form and Substance, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 99 (2006); Anthony Jones, Comment, Jogi
v. Voges: Has the Seventh Circuit Opened the Floodgates to Vienna Convention Litigation in
U.S. Courts?, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 425 (2006).
189. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b) ("[]f [the detained foreign national] so requests, the
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner .... The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph."
(emphasis added)).
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duty upon arresting officials to, upon the alien's request, inform the
alien's consulate of the arrest. 9 '
Depending on where in the treaty the court begins its analysis of
whether the treaty confers a primary right upon an individual, the
courts reach different results.19" ' Those whose analysis begins with
the Convention's preamble.92 hold that the VCCR was intended only
to govern consular relations,'93 and not to provide individual primary
rights. On the other hand, those whose analysis begins with the
treaty's operative text come to the opposite conclusion.194 Generally,
both statutory and treaty construction call for courts to resort to
preambles as interpretation aids only when the text is ambiguous.'95
Finally, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to
settle this issue in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,'96 but declined to do
so. ' Instead, the Court assumed that the VCCR created a private
primary right, and dismissed the case for other reasons.'98
190. Id.
191. Quigley notes that the reluctance of courts to give foreign nationals private rights under
article 36 is partly the fault of the Executive Branch, where "the State Department has
maintained, contrary to the clear text of the Vienna Convention, that the right of consular access
relates only to the two States involved-the receiving State and the sending State-but not to a
foreign national detainee." Quigley, supra note 7, at 565.
192. VCCR, supra note 2, pmbl. ("Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and
immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by
consular posts on behalf of their respective States .... (emphasis added)).
193. See, e.g., Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 388-93; United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d
192, 196-98 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc).
194. See, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 374-76 (7th Cir. 2005) ("There is an obvious
tension between the broad language of the clause in the Preamble that appears to disclaim any
general intent to protect individuals, and the language of Article 36."); Standt v. New York, 153
F. Supp. 2d 417, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (deciding that the preamble's reference to "individuals"
meant that the VCCR was not intended to create rights for consular officials, not that it intended
no rights for individual foreign nationals).
195. Jogi, 425 F.3d at 381 ("It is a mistake in any event to allow general language of a
preamble to create an ambiguity in specific statutory or treaty text where none exists. Courts
should look to materials like preambles and titles only if the text of the instrument is
ambiguous.").
196. 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006).
197. However, in her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg did conclude that the VCCR
created a private primary right, id. at 2688 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), as did Justice Breyer in his
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Stevens and Souter, id. at 2690 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
198. Id. at 2674 (deciding two cases together, the Court held that suppression of evidence was
not a proper remedy for violation of the VCCR and that a post-conviction habeus claim based on
a VCCR violation was subject to state procedural-default rules which barred the defendant's
claim).
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(B). Secondary right
Since by its terms, the VCCR only applies to "competent
authorities" with the power to arrest, detain, or commit individuals to
prison,'99 in the United States it only applies to local, state and
federal law enforcement officials. Therefore, an individual foreign
national whose primary rights under the VCCR are violated may sue
local, state, or federal law enforcement officials using 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or Bivens as private rights of action."° Therefore, there is no
need to imply a secondary right or private right of action from the




Generally, a violation of the VCCR will not justify suppressing
evidence, 22 overturning convictions 23 or indictments, or granting
habeas petitions.2 4  Also, procedural default rules do apply, so the
plaintiff must assert his or her VCCR claim at trial.20 5 However, an
individual may sue for damages. 6
199. VCCR, supra note 2, at art. 36.1.b.
200. See supra Part C.2.a.
201. Standt v. New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). However, even after
endorsing Vdzquez's approach in Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, which calls for carefully
distinguishing primary and secondary rights, id. at 423, the court gets sloppy when it states, "[i]n
sum, the language of the VCCR, coupled with its 'legislative history' and subsequent operation,
suggest that Article 36 of the VCCR was intended to provide a private right of action to
individuals detained by foreign officials." Id. at 427. Then the court quotes a case which
reasoned, "the better reading of the treaty is that a foreign national does have standing to assert
his or her right to consular notification under Article 36 of the [Vienna] Convention." Id.
(quoting United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Standing and a
private right of action do not refer to the same analytical issue. See supra Part C. 1. Even so, it is
clear that the court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be the private right of action which the
plaintiff, an alien, was invoking to enforce his primary rights under the VCCR. Standt, 153 F.
Supp. 2d at 427-30 (dismissing the lack of enumerated remedy in the VCCR as a reason not to
allow § 1983 claims for violations of those rights).
202. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006) ("We conclude, even assuming
the [Vienna] Convention creates judicially enforceable rights, that suppression is not an
appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36 .... ").
203. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 376.
206. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2680 (noting that the terms of the VCCR "require an
appropriate judicial remedy of some kind," and so has not foreclosed the possibility that the Court
will endorse suing for monetary damages for violating the VCCR).
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Sometimes courts will discuss the secondary right or private
right of action issue in terms of whether the treaty provides a
remedy. For example, in Jogi v. Voges, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed the defense's argument that the VCCR contained no
private right of action because the treaty itself did not dictate
appropriate judicial remedies for its violation."7 In its decision, the
court properly noted that multilateral treaties involve countries with
sometimes very different legal systems."8 Therefore, to agree on a
uniform remedy would be impracticable. However, the VCCR does
contain a mandate that
[t]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 of... Article
[36] shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State, [the State where the
foreign national finds himself detained,] subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended. 9
Therefore, the court concluded: "This means that a country may
not reject every single path for vindicating the individual's treaty
rights. In the absence of any administrative remedy or other
alternative to measures we have already rejected (such as
suppression of evidence), a damages action is the only avenue
left.
210
(D). Subject Matter Jurisdiction
There are two jurisdictional statutes which would allow a claim
based on the VCCR to be plead in federal court. First, because the
VCCR only applies to foreign nationals, jurisdiction is proper under
28 U.S.C. § 1350,211 the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), if violation of
the VCCR amounts to a tort.21 2 The ATS reads, "The district courts
207. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
208. Id. ("It is unremarkable that the [VCCR] does not spell out particular methods of
enforcement. Treaties, after all, are signed by countries with differing legal systems that provide
different kinds of remedies.").
209. VCCR, supra note 2, art. 36(2).
210. Jogi, 425 F.3d at 385.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see supra note 159 and accompanying text.
212. The Seventh Circuit did not decide whether a violation of the VCCR amounted to a tort
for purposes of the ATS because they determined jurisdiction by the federal courts would also be
proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States. ''1
Second, by its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction
over cases "arising under" treaties. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper
under the general federal question statute.214 In addition, Congress
may execute Article III's constitutional grant of jurisdiction by
enacting other statutory jurisdictional statutes. 2 5  Even so, cases
within Congress' statutory jurisdictional mandates must fulfill
Article III's requirements.1 6  For example, several treaties
implementing statutes have contained express Congressional grants
of federal subject matter jurisdiction.217
ii. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction:
A treaty with an express private right of action
Historically, a parent had no recourse to secure the return of
children whose other parent moved them internationally in violation
of a custody order. Sometimes the removing parent took their
children in search of a better forum in which to adjudicate their
custody disputes, 218 others to escape abusive relationships. 219  Many
Because we have found that jurisdiction is proper under either the ATS or the general
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, we need not decide whether a violation of
Article 36 is best characterized as a "tort" (perhaps something along the lines of breach
of duty to disclose in the context of a special relationship) or a regulatory violation.
Jogi, 425 F.3d at 385. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), when it reversed the district court's
dismissal of Jogi's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jogi, 425 F.3d at 371-73. In
Sosa, the Supreme Court limited the ATS to a jurisdictional mandate only, except for certain
violations of customary international law norms which are "so well defined as to support the
creation of a federal remedy," where § 1350 could provide a private right of action. Sosa, 542
U.S. at 738. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit rightly held that Jogi could plead his claim against
the county law enforcement officials using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and then jurisdiction was proper
under the treaty "branch" of § 1350 and under the general federal question statute, § 133 1. Jogi,
425 F.3d at 373 ("Today, we cannot imagine a case that an alien could bring under the 'treaty'
branch of § 1350 that would not also fall within the 'treaty' jurisdiction of § 1331.").
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
214. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
215. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1369 (2006).
216. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) (citing Hodgson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809)).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 11603; 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205. See also D.2.b.i. infra for more discussion.
218. For a general exposition on forum selection in the context of international disputes, see
Petrossian, supra note 26.
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countries did not consider this to be kidnapping, only a parental
custody dispute, and were therefore not invested in assisting the
abandoned parent. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention") was signed in
1980 to establish judicial procedures to affect the prompt return of
children moved internationally in violation of de facto custody
arrangements or formal custody orders.220  Signatory countries
wanted to discourage parents from forum shopping, but
acknowledging that a child's mandated return to one parent might
endanger both child and parent, they adopted some affirmative
defenses to wrongful removal and retention claims.22' For example,
where the removing parent can show that there is a "grave risk" of
"physical or psychological harm" associated with returning the child
219. Apparently the Convention's drafters anticipated that the abductors would generally be
fathers who were denied custody rights. Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of
Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 749, 764-65 (2003) [hereinafter Weiner, Domestic Violence].
In fact, approximately seventy percent of abductors are custodial mothers, often fleeing domestic
violence. Id. at 765 (citing Nigel Lowe et al., A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 1999
under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Preliminary Doc. No. 3 of March 2001 for the Attention of the Special Commission of
March 2001, 8 (2001)).
220. Hague Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. ("Firmly convinced that the interests of children
are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody, Desiring to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish
procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to
secure protections for rights of access .... "). See generally Linda Silberman, Patching Up the
Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and a Suggestion for
Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 41, 44 (2003) [hereinafter Silberman, Patching Up];
Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1049 (2005); Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity
and Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 275 (2002) [hereinafter Weiner,
Purposive Analysis]; Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 219.
221. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(b). While these "well-settled" exceptions to
mandatory return are available, Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12, some scholars advocate
for amending the Hague Convention to better protect domestic violence victims. E.g., Silberman,
Patching Up, supra note 220, at 45 ("An exception for an 'abducting custodial mother' has been
created in a variety of ways in the Convention. Though no such double standard should be
tolerated, the Convention must find more creative responses to the realities of trying to separate a
child from its primary caretaker and of protecting children and a spouse from abuse or domestic
violence when necessary."); Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 219, at 769 ("The Hague
Convention on Child Abduction traps countless numbers of women and children in abusive
relationships. These are victims who never try to flee for safety because they know the Hague
Convention will force them to return their children.").
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to the country of origin, the courts may decline to enforce the
return.222
The United States implemented the provisions of the Hague
Convention when Congress passed 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 in
1988, which it called the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act ("ICARA"). 3
To place this discussion within this article's broader discussion
of treaty rights, the Hague Convention and ICARA pose different
interpretative concerns than the VCCR. First, whether the Hague
Convention is self-executing is not an issue with which to be
concerned. Congress expressly implemented the Hague Convention
when it passed ICARA in 1988.24 In contrast, the VCCR is self-
executing and so implementing legislation is unnecessary. Second,
in contrast to the VCCR,225 it is only necessary for the courts to
determine how broadly to interpret ICARA's primary rights because
ICARA contains an express private right of action.226 Moreover,
unlike the VCCR,227 courts do not have to imply private right of
action for ICARA to be enforceable by an individual in a judicial
proceeding.2 28 Third, Congress expressly gave state and federal
courts concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under the Hague
Convention and ICARA.229 Also unlike the VCCR,23 ° subject matter
jurisdiction is appropriate given ICARA's express provision of 42
U.S.C. § 11603,231 and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is redundant.
However, even though the ICARA poses seemingly fewer
opportunities for judicial interpretation, the federal courts have
narrowly construed the Hague Convention and ICARA-perhaps to
the point of contravening Congress' intent.232  This discussion
highlights that one still must beware of courts' efforts to restrict
access to federal courts for cases arising under treaties-especially
222. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 13(b).
223. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (2000).
224. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 2006).
225. See supra Part D.2.a.i.A.
226. See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 202.
227. See supra Part D.2.a.i.B.
228. See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 202.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006).
230. See supraD.2.a.i.D.
231. See infra Part.D.2.a.ii.D.
232. See id.
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where those treaties' subject matters concern traditionally municipal
issues like family law-even where a treaty has been implemented
with a jurisdictional provision.
(A). Primary right
The findings section of ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a), sets the
framework for a court's analysis of ICARA and the scope of its
primary rights233:
(1) The international abduction or wrongful retention
of children is harmful to their well-being.
(4) The Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on
October 25, 1980, establishes legal rights and procedures
for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully
removed or retained, as well as for securing the exercise of
visitation rights. Children who are wrongfully removed or
retained within the meaning of the Convention are to be
promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set
forth in the Convention applies. The Convention provides a
sound treaty framework to help resolve the problem of
international abduction and retention of children and will
deter such wrongful removals and retentions. 34
This text clearly establishes a private primary right to have one's
children returned to them if their children were removed from the
country wrongfully or are wrongfully retained.235 Moreover, it is
233. See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 199.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(1), (4) (2006) (emphasis added). There, the United States adopted
the same tone as the Hague Convention used in its preamble. The Hague Convention preamble
states:
The States signatory to the present Convention, Firmly convinced that the interests of
children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody, Desiring to
protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their
habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access [visitation rights],
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the
following provisions ....
Hague Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. (footnote omitted).
235. Compare to the language of the VCCR interpreted by the court in Jogi, 425 F.3d 367,
374 (7th Cir. 2005). See supra Parts D.2.a.i.A-B; see also supra note 201.
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clear that the federal courts will exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over wrongful removal and wrongful retention claims. 36
However, Congress distinguished between adjudicating
international abductions and turning federal court into family court
when it included the following in the declarations section ICARA:
"The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the United
States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the
merits of any underlying child custody claims. ' 37  This provision
makes sense given that federal courts have long abstained from
asserting jurisdiction over custody suits, even those with proper
diversity jurisdiction. 8
However, § 11601 (a)(4) still indicates that these provisions may
be used to "secur[e] the exercise of visitation rights" as well.239
Despite this, the Fourth Circuit in Cantor v. Cohen24' has interpreted
this language very narrowly and denied the federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction over claims involving visitation rights, in apparent
contradiction with the express language of § 11601(a)(4).1
41
Regardless of whether courts conclude Congress' intent should drive
their exercise of subject matter jurisdiction,242 several federal courts
have similarly ignored ICARA's plain language.243
236. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 202 ("With the exception of the limited matters of international child
abduction or wrongful removal claims, which is expressly addressed by the Convention and
ICARA, other child custody matters, including access claims, would be better handled by the
state courts which have the experience to deal with this specific area of the law.").
237. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4).
238. Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Cantor, 442 F.3d at 202 (citing Cole v.
Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980)); Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1983).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4).
240. 442 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2006).
241. See infra PartD.2.a.ii.D.. In fact, the court has so narrowly interpreted this section that it
seems to have been effectively read out of the statute.
242. See supra Part C.2.b.
243. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 201. The Cantor court cited the following decisions when it
declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a case involving access claims under the
Hague Convention and ICARA: Naik v. Naik, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 (N.D. 111. 2005);
Wiggill v. Janicki, 262 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (S.D.W. Va. 2003); Neng Nhia Yi Ly v. Heu, 296 F.
Supp. 2d 1009, 1011 (D. Minn. 2003); Teijeiro Fernandez v. Yeager, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125
(W.D. Mich. 2000); Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860-61 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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(B). Secondary Right
ICARA expressly states that "[i]t is the purpose of this chapter
to establish procedures for the implementation of the Convention in
the United States." 2" Moreover,
[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under
the Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements
for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
access to a child may do so by commencing a civil
action.., in any court which has jurisdiction of such
action .... 245
Even though this language seems clear, the Fourth Circuit in Cantor
has performed an interpretative dance to ensure that "rights of
access" may not be adjudicated in federal court.2 46 Noting Congress'
repeated reference to rights "under the Convention," the court went
back to the language of the Hague Convention for guidance. 47
Article 21 of the Hague Convention deals with actions to secure
access or visitation rights.248 It states, "[t]he Central Authorities,
either directly or through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the
institution of proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting
these [access] rights .... ", In the United States, the Central
Authority is the State Department.250  The court then compared
Article 21's language, which lacks any mention of judicial
proceedings, with Article 12, which expressly states that the 'Judicial
or administrative authority ... shall ... order the return of the child"
who has been wrongfully removed or retained.25' Therefore, the
court held that "under the Convention, [there is] no right to initiate
judicial proceedings for access claims ... "252 The court reached this
244. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(1).
245. Id. § 11603(b) (emphasis added).
246. See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 199-202.
247. Id. at 199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b)).
248. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 21.
249. Id.
250. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 200.
251. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12; Cantor, 442 F.3d at 209 (Traxler, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Ly v. Heu, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1011 (D. Minn. 2006)
(noting "[t]he lack of parallelism between Article 12 and Article 21 has led the district courts that
have considered the issue to conclude that the Convention creates no judicial power to enforce
rights of access")).
252. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 200. Contra id. at 208 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
11603(b)) (noting that § 11603 "expressly contemplates that such actions [given concurrent
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result despite the fact that once a non-self-executing treaty is
implemented, it is the implementing legislation which constitutes the
controlling domestic law-not the treaty.253
Additional evidence that Congress intended to allow courts to
adjudicate all claims arising under the Convention, including access
claims, is found in § 11603(e). 2 4 There, Congress established the
burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) for proving that a
child has been wrongfully removed or retained.255 But Congress also
established preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof
required to show that the petitioner has access rights, so that the
petitioner might "organiz[e] or secur[e] the effective exercise of
rights of access . "256
(C). Remedies
The only remedy for wrongful removal or retention prescribed
by the Hague Convention is the return of the child to the jurisdiction
which originally determined the custody arrangements. 257  By
requiring the child's return without considering the merits of the
parent's claims, the treaty's parties hoped to reduce forum
shopping.258 In addition, Congress adopted several of the Hague
Convention's affirmative defenses in ICARA.259
However, the Cantor court adopted a distinction between the
remedy available for wrongful removal or retention and that
available in a case concerning visitation rights created in a Fourth
jurisdiction in state and federal court] may include not only claims for the return of a child being
held in violation of custody rights, but also claims 'for organizing or securing the effective
exercise of rights of access"').
253. Id. at 210 (Traxler, J., dissenting) ("Despite the weight of authority, I am unconvinced,
based on the language of ICARA, that federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Cantor's
claim. In my view, even assuming for analytical purposes that the Hague Convention itself does
not afford the non-custodial parent a judicial forum to enforce his rights to access, Congress
nevertheless has done so."). Judge Traxler appropriately focused his interpretation on the
implementing legislation of the Hague Convention because that is the enforceable domestic law.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2006).
255. Id. § 1 1603(e)(1)(A).
256. Id. § 1 1603(e)(1)(B).
257. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12.
258. Bader v. Kramer, 445 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d
392, 398 (4th Cir. 2001)).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2) (2006).
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Circuit unpublished opinion.260 That court noted that the remedies
for access claims are "less drastic" than those for wrongful removal
or retention.261 For example, the remedy for violating rights of access
can be to "order[] that the custodial parent ... reimburse the other
parent for expenses incurred in exercising his or her rights of
access."262 Whereas the remedy for wrongful removal or retention in
violation of custody rights is return of the child, except where limited
exceptions apply.263
(D). Subject Matter Jurisdiction
According to ICARA, "The courts of the States and the United
States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of
actions arising under the Convention."2" In addition, Congress
empowered our courts "to determine ... rights under the
Convention .... ,26" However, as discussed above, the Fourth Circuit
has interpreted rights of access out of the "rights under the
Convention" which may be adjudicated in federal or state court
pursuant to § 11603(a).266 In Judge Traxler's dissenting opinion in
Cantor, he noted, "[o]n its face, the unqualified phrase 'rights under
the Convention' encompasses 'rights of access' as well as 'rights of
custody."'267  Therefore, Traxler concluded that a "straightforward
reading" of § 11603 "suggests that ICARA affords aggrieved parents
a judicial forum for resolving claims that involve either custody
rights or access rights .... "268 Moreover, Judge Traxler correctly
adopted the Restatement's position that the implementing legislation
of a non-self-executing treaty is what Congress has determined to be
enforceable domestic law.2 69 Therefore,
260. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Katona v. Kovacs, 148 F.
App'x 158 (4th Cir. 2005)).
261. Id. (citing Katona, 148 F. App'x at 160)
262. Id. (citing Katona, 148 F. App'x at 160 (quoting Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 455 n.3
(lst Cir. 2000))).
263. Id. (citing Whallon, 230 F.3d at 455 n.3).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a).
265. Id. § 11601(b)(4).
266. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
267. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 208 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 210 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987)).
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[i]n determining whether a judicial forum exists for the
enforcement of access rights, I would not relegate the
analysis solely to the text of the Hague Convention but
instead would begin with the language of ICARA's judicial
remedies provision and refer to the language of the
Convention to inform my understanding of ICARA.
... [S]ection 11603(b) unquestionably permits-in
straightforward and unambiguous language-judicial
proceedings alleging the wrongful removal of a child in
violation of custody rights or the denial of the non-custodial
parent's rights of access to the child, or both.70
Whether or not Traxler's dissenting opinion is ultimately
vindicated, at this point federal courts have been stingy in their
interpretation of ICARA's jurisdictional mandate. Claims arising
under the Hague Convention and ICARA, but which involve rights
of access, will likely be adjudicated in state court.27" '
iii. Creation test: A summary
To summarize, treaties containing private rights of action-
whether express or implied-automatically fall within 28 U.S.C. §
1331 's statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction.272 This is the
so-called Creation Test. 73 This article discusses two very different
treaties which may be adjudicated in federal court because they
contain private rights of action. The first, the VCCR, has been
interpreted to contain implied secondary rights274 which can be
adjudicated in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general
federal question statute, or 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Alien Tort
Statute.275 The second, the Hague Convention, was implemented by
Congress to contain express statutory primary and secondary
rights.276 In addition, Congress included a jurisdictional mandate in
270. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b)).
271. Id. at 202 (majority opinion).
272. See supra Part D.2.a.
273. See id..
274. See supra Part D.2.a.i.B.
275. See supra PartD.2.a.i.D..
276. See supra Parts.D.2.a.ii.A-B.
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ICARA.277 However, some courts have narrowly interpreted this
grant of jurisdiction so that only some of the primary rights
established by ICARA may be adjudicated in federal court.278
b. Federal question jurisdiction:
Using state law causes of action to get into federal court
Where Congress has not expressly or impliedly created a federal
private right of action, the litigant has the option to argue that the
remedies for the treaty's violation are provided by state common
law.279 To do this, the litigant must argue that the state common law
cause of action depends on the interpretation of a particular treaty
provision.
In order for federal courts to appropriately assert subject matter
jurisdiction over a state common law claim, the state cause of action
must rely on an essential,281 substantial282 and disputed283 federal
issue, which appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.
284
But even when the state action discloses a contested
and substantial federal question, the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is subject to a possible veto. For the federal
issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if
federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional
277. See supra Part D.2.a.ii.D..
278. See id.
279. This federal question problem has been called the "litigation-provoking problem" by
Justice Frankfurter. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809-10 (1986)
(quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
280. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 1, at 1144-46.
281. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (To fall within statutory federal
question jurisdiction, "a right or immunity created by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States [i.e., federal law] must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of
action.").
282. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) ("[T]he
plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law."); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). Contra Merrell Dow
Pharm., 478 U.S. at 822 n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A] test based upon an ad hoc evaluation
of the importance of the federal issue is infinitely malleable: at what point does a federal interest
become strong enough to create jurisdiction? What principles guide the determination whether a
statute is 'important' or not?").
283. The Supreme Court held "a case may arise under federal law 'where the vindication of a
right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law."' Merrell Dow
Pharms., 478 U.S. at 808-09 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9).
284. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
Summer 2007] TREA TY-BASED RIGHTS
judgment about the sound division of labor between state
and federal courts governing the application of [28 U.S.C.]
§ 1331.
... [Therefore,] the question is, does a state-law claim
necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed
and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.285
In addition, until the Supreme Court decided Grable in 2005, some
circuits, relying on the Court's ambiguous language in Merrell Dow,
denied federal question jurisdiction if there was no federal cause of
action.286 Thankfully for litigants pursuing treaty-based claims, in
Grable the Court retreated from the idea that Merrell Dow
"convert[ed] a federal cause of action from a sufficient condition for
federal-question jurisdiction into a necessary one." '287 Therefore,
"Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of
a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not
285. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2005).
Contrast Justice Brennan's statement in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals:
And, while the increased volume of litigation may appropriately be considered in
connection with reasoned arguments that justify limiting the reach of § 133 1, 1 do not
believe that the day has yet arrived when this Court may trim a statute solely because it
thinks that Congress made it too broad.
478 U.S. at 829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286. Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 311. The confusion in the wake of Merrell Dow is
understandable given language like this:
We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should be no
federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional
conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a
state cause of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question
jurisdiction.
Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added). In Merrell Dow, Justice Brennan also
strongly criticized the majority's vaguely reasoned conclusion that no federal remedy or cause of
action means no federal question jurisdiction:
Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private federal remedy mean
that Congress would not want there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim
that imposes liability for violating the federal law? Clearly, the decision not to provide
a private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the reasons
Congress withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for withholding federal
jurisdiction. Thus, it is necessary to examine the reasons for Congress' decisions to
grant or withhold both federal jurisdiction and private remedies, something the Court
has not done.
Id. at 825-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287. Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
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dispositive of, the 'sensitive judgments about congressional intent'
that § 1331 requires." '288
The litigant must balance between two countervailing issues: the
so-called "floodgates" issue and abstention. On the one hand, it is
obvious that the concern for "opening the floodgates" is integral in a
federal court's decision to assert subject matter jurisdiction over a
particular class of claims. Therefore, a litigant who wishes to
adjudicate his or her claim in federal court must convince that court
that allowing a state law claim based on a treaty's primary right will
not open the floodgates. While litigation in the area of international
human rights, business, and environment has increased in the last
quarter century, this type of claim should not generally be considered
a "litigation-provoking problem."28 9
In addition, as opposed to state law claims based on federal
primary rights, a state law claim based on a treaty's primary right
implicates international obligations and foreign policy. These are
excellent policy reasons for allowing these types of claims into
federal court. On the other hand, these international law and foreign
policy implications create the reasons for judicial abstention in the
form of forum non conveniens transfers, dismissal for reasons of
comity or the political question doctrine. So while the litigant can
use foreign policy as a reason for allowing the case into federal
court, the litigant must take care to emphasize that by accepting
jurisdiction the judiciary is playing its appropriate role and is not
encroaching on the executive branch's turf. This is a tight balancing
act because the various ways that the judiciary may abstain from
hearing a case are the reasons why adjudicating treaty-based rights in
federal law will not open the floodgates.
288. Id. at 318 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 810). Citing its reasons for
Merrell Dow,
The Court saw the missing cause of action not as a missing federal door key, always
required, but as a missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances, when
exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action would have attracted a
horde of original filings and removal cases raising other state claims with embedded
federal issues.
Id.




i. Treaties: Substantial, disputed federal questions?
At this time (to the knowledge of this author), no court has
determined a state law cause of action "arises under" federal law
where it implicated a treaty. Several courts interpreted one Texas
statute, Texas Revised Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.031,
as creating a substantial federal question worthy of allowing removal
of state law causes of action brought under it290 until the Fifth Circuit
closed that door when it decided Torres v. Southern Peru Copper
Corporation in 1997.291 Section 71.031 granted plaintiffs injured in
foreign countries standing in Texas courts when the country in which
they had been injured had "equal treaty rights" with the United
States. 92 This required Texas courts to interpret various treaties of
friendship and, so the argument went, thus created a substantial,
disputed federal question allowing removal of the claim to federal
court. 93 But the Fifth Circuit determined that "[t]he mere fact that
section 71.031 requires a Texas state court to examine treaties to
determine whether a plaintiff has standing is insufficient by itself to
create federal jurisdiction."'2 94 However, it is noteworthy that this
case was decided pre-Grable. If Grable expands a court's analysis
of whether federal question jurisdiction exists beyond mere
determination of whether an express private right of action exists,295
then a treaty which provides a litigant with primary rights may be
sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction.296
There are several reasons why no litigant has successfully
maintained or removed a state law cause of action based upon a
treaty-based primary right to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331. For one, so few treaties affect the rights of individuals,
compared to those which govern state action. In addition, enforcing
a treaty which affects the primary rights and obligations of states and
290. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 675, 679 (Tex. 1990) (determining
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens had been statutorily abolished, so did not apply in this
case, but that federal subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate even so); see also Thad T.
Dameris & Michael J. Mucchetti, Vectors to Federal Court: Unique Approaches to Subject
Matter Jurisdiction in Aviation Cases, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 959, 965-68 (1997).
291. 113 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1997).
292. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.03 1(a)(3) (Vernon 2006).
293. Dameris & Mucchetti, supra note 290, at 966-67.
294. Torres, 113 F.3d at 542.
295. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
296. See infra D.2.b.ii.B for further discussion of this possibility.
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their officials necessarily means that, upon breach, the plaintiff or
defendant will be the state or its officials. In that case, subject matter
jurisdiction may be appropriate under the FSIA.297 On the other
hand, what cannot be done pursuant to § 1331, may be done pursuant
to other Congressionally created jurisdictional provisions.
ii. State law causes of action with federal
jurisdictional mandates: The New York Convention
Just as Congress executed Article III's jurisdictional grants in
1875 when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Congress has the power
under Article II to create other jurisdictional statutes. Even so,
Congress is nonetheless constrained by the terms of Article 111.298
However, when Congress exercises its constitutional right to pass
federal statutes which comprehensively regulate a particular field, it
may also choose to allow federal courts to adjudicate cases "arising
under" that set of laws.299 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found
that Congress may pass jurisdictional statues which grant federal
jurisdiction over "purely" state law causes of action when it does so
pursuant to a comprehensive federal statutory framework, because
the jurisdictional mandate reflects Article III "arising under
jurisdiction.""3 ' Nonetheless, the requirements detailed in Part IV
still apply: the case must necessarily raise a disputed question under
the comprehensive federal statutory scheme created by Congress.3 '
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2006). To be clear, FSIA does not provide a cause of action itself.
E.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620
(1983). In addition, the FSIA only abrogates sovereign immunity in particular circumstances.
298. For a recent case where Congress' power to pass jurisdictional statutes was challenged
for exceeding Article III, see Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (finding that
Congress was within its rights to allow plaintiffs to sue foreign states in federal court using non-
federal causes of action pursuant to the FSIA, a broad federal statutory framework governing
sovereign immunity).
299. See id. at 496-97 ("That the inquiry into foreign sovereign immunity is labeled under
[FSIA] as a matter of jurisdiction does not affect the constitutionality of Congress' action in
granting federal courts jurisdiction over cases calling for application of this comprehensive
regulatory statute.").
300. See Mizuna, Ltd. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank, 90 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
the jurisdictional provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 is constitutional); Verlinden B.V. 461 U.S. at 494-96 (holding that the jurisdictional
provision of the FSIA is constitutional).
301. Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 493-94 ("At the threshold of every action in a district court
against a foreign state, therefore, the court must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions [to a
foreign sovereign's default immunity] applies-and in doing so it must apply the detailed federal
law standards set forth in the Act.").
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The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")
was drafted in 1958 to "assist the uniform and efficient enforcement
of arbitration agreements and awards in foreign commerce. 3 2 Thus,
signatories of the New York Convention agree to enforce arbitration
provisions and their subsequent awards." 3 The United States ratified
the New York Convention in 1970, with reservations that the treaty
be non-self-executing, and Congress passed implementing legislation
in 1970.304 The implementing legislation was codified in Chapter 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act.
(A). Primary right
As implemented in the United States, the New York Convention
did not create new primary rights. Instead, Congress ratified the
New York Convention in 1970 with the sole intention of funneling
international arbitral disputes, regardless of the fact that they would
be being enforced by purely state law causes of action, into federal
court.3"5
(B). Secondary right
As with primary rights, the New York Convention did not create
an express or implied private right of action with which to enforce
arbitral awards. As with the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress
expected that litigants would invoke state common law causes of
action to enforce these contractual provisions.3 6 However, Congress
was ready to allow those cases "'reasonabl[y] relat[ed]' [to] a foreign
state" to be adjudicated in federal court.307
(C). Remedies
As with primary and secondary rights, the New York
Convention, as implemented by Congress, did not create new
302. Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano v. Consalvi Int'l Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 421, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing S. REP. No. 91-702, at 6 (1970)).
303. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 666 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002).
304. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970) (also known as Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act).
305. See Beiser, 284 F.3d at 666 n.2.
306. See Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
307. Beiser, 284 F.3d at 666 n.2.
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remedies. Congress anticipated that state law would regulate
available remedies for breach of contract.
(D). Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The implementing legislation for the New York Convention
includes two jurisdictional provisions. The first, 9 U.S.C. § 203,
grants Article III courts original jurisdiction over "[a]n action or
proceeding falling under the Convention. 3 °8 The second, 9 U.S.C. §
205, expressly provides removal jurisdiction for any case "[w]here
the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court
relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the [New
York] Convention, the defendant... may, at any time before trial
thereof, remove such action ... ."" In addition, § 205 goes on to
stipulate that "[t]he procedure for removal of causes otherwise
provided by law shall apply, except that the ground for removal
provided in this section need not appear on the face of the complaint
but may be shown in the petition for removal. 31°
There are three reasons why the language and application of §
205 are significant: first, "relates to" is far broader language than the
"arising under" language incorporated by reference into the standard
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441;311 second, § 205 expressly
abrogates the well-pleaded complaint rule; 312 and third, the notice of
removal may be served "any time before the trial.
313
While federal question jurisdiction is determined by whether the
claim "arises under" federal law, § 205 only requires that the claim
"relate to" an arbitration agreement which falls under the
Convention.314  This phrase, "relates to," has been interpreted as
broadly as it seems:
[W]henever an arbitration agreement falling under the
Convention could conceivably affect the outcome of the
plaintiffs case, the agreement "relates to" to the plaintiffs
suit.... As long as the defendant's assertion [that the
308. 9 U.S.C. § 203.
309. Id. § 205 (emphasis added).
310. Id.
311. Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
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contract falls under the Convention] is not completely
absurd or impossible, it is at least conceivable that the
arbitration clause will impact the disposition of the case.
That is all that is required to meet the low bar of "relates
to. "315
In contrast, the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441,
predicates proper removal on whether the claim could have been
filed in federal district court in the first place.3"6 Therefore, § 1441
incorporates § 1331's "arising under" language. 317  As discussed
above, "arising under" has been interpreted much more strictly,3 8
and accordingly requires more nuanced argumentation than when
asserting proper subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 205.
In addition, § 205 expressly abrogates the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 3 9  This rule normally requires that the basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction appear on the face of the plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint.3 20  However, § 205 states, "the ground for
removal provided.., need not appear on the face of the complaint
but may be shown in the petition for removal" 32 '-a document
generally employed by defendants.
Finally, § 205 abrogates 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)'s requirement that
the notice of removal be filed within thirty days of service of the
state court pleadings.322
315. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir 2002).
316. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) (stating that defendants may remove to federal court "any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction"); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (holding that removal is
proper if the case could have been filed in federal court originally).
317. Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano v. Consalvi Int'l, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
318. See supra notes 1778-82.
319. Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 427, 429 (noting that the statute
requires the court to determine "whether a defendant's defense arises under federal law from the
'petition for removal' alone"). Section 205 is constitutional even though it abrogates the well-
pleaded complaint rule. See id. at 429-32. The well-pleaded complaint rule is a construction of
28 U.S.C. § 1331, a statute, not of Article III. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63
(1987). Since Article III does not require the basis for removal to appear on the face of a well-
pleaded complaint, Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), § 205 is
constitutional.
320. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63 ("It is long settled law that a cause of action arises
under federal law only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.").
321. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
322. Banco de Santander Cent. Hispano, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
(2006)).
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As a result of these three significant differences, courts have
concluded that Congress intended Chapter 2 to "'channel'
Convention cases 'away from the state courts and into federal
courts... "'323 Consequently, § 205 allows "purely" state law
causes of action to be removed to federal court. 24
3. Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
The Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows aliens
to bring tort claims for violations of treaties or laws of nations.325
Accordingly, aliens may enforce primary rights gained from two
sources: self-executing treaties and the laws of nations. However,
most treaties affecting individuals, with the exception of the VCCR,
are non-self-executing.326 But treaties still play a role in ATS
litigation: litigants use multi-lateral, non-self-executing treaties as
evidence of what comprises the "law of nations" or customary
international law.3 27  The Supreme Court recently discussed the
323. Id. at 432-33 (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493) (1983))
(acknowledging that even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that Chapter 2 is a
statutory scheme sufficient which "comprehensively regulat[es]" a federal interest, as it has for
FSIA, "this Court is convinced that under the teachings of Verlinden and Mizuna Chapter 2
constitutes a 'comprehensive scheme' that furthers 'uncontested' ... goals").
324. Id. at 430.
325. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."). See generally Charles F. Marshall, Re-framing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic v.
Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 591 (1996); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction
over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1 (1985); Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473 (1986). Much of the current debate
regarding the ATS discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004), and its definition of "law of nations." See generally Benjamin Berkowitz,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: United States Courts as Forums for Human Rights Cases and the New
Incorporation Debate, 40 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2005); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L.
Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and
Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 273
(2006); Sean D. Murphy, Supreme Court Interpretation of Alien Tort Claims Act, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 845 (2004); Van Alstine, Age of Treaties, supra note 3. Very little has been written on the
"treaty prong" of the ATS.
326. See supra note 4.
327. E.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 157 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing ICJ
Statute, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, U.S.T.S. 993) (noting that the ICJ accepts
conventions as "competent proof of the content of customary international law"); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948), the Declaration on the
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definition of a law of nations in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain3 21: "[W]e
think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law
of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with ... specificity .... "I
In addition, this strategy can be applied to treaties between one
or more non-signatory parties.33 ° For example, one court has
analyzed the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child
Abduction to determine if international parental child abduction
violates the law of nations.33 In this case, Taveras v. Taveras,332 the
court could not simply apply the Hague Convention as a treaty, as
discussed above,333 because the two claimants were from the
Dominican Republic and their custody claim arose before the Hague
Convention bound the United States and the Dominican Republic to
enforce each country's custody decisions.334  Therefore, the
plaintiffs plea for return could only be governed by the Hague
Convention's principles and obligations if the court determined that
the Hague Convention itself represented the law of nations. 35 In that
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, General Assembly Resolution 3452,
30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc A/1034 (1975), as evidence that torture violates the
law of nations); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 279
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998); Rosencranz &
Campbell, supra note 7, at 154, 169 (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789,
794 (9th Cir. 1996)) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit requires that the content of ... international law.., be
proven by reference to 'the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to
the works of jurists and commentators.' The types of materials cited by the Ninth Circuit have
included United Nations documents ... and conventions .....
328. 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
329. Id.
330. E.g., Taveras v. Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d 908 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
331. Id. at 911.
332. Id.
333. See supra D.2.a.ii.
334. Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 911. According to this court, "the Dominican Republic
acceded to the Hague Convention on August 11, 2004 and its provisions went into effect there on
November 1, 2005." Id. However, Article 36 of the Hague Convention requires that each new
party to the Hague Convention gain the "acceptance of the accession" from each of the current
parties to the Hague Convention, the "Contracting States." Hague Convention, supra note 4, art.
38. "It is undisputed that the United States and the Dominican Republic have not entered into the
negotiations required by Article 38. Consequently, the Convention's administrative and judicial
mechanisms are not yet applicable with regard to relations between the two countries." Taveras,
397 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (citing Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2002)
("Accession... binds a country only with respect to other nations that accept its particular
accession under Article 38.")).
335. Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (plaintiff citing Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D.
Md. 1961), in support of his position).
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case, subject matter jurisdiction would be appropriate pursuant to §
1350.336
After a long discussion of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,337 which, as discussed above, itself
included a long discussion of when it was appropriate for a court to
define a new violation of the law of nations,338 the court determined
that the defendant's conduct in abducting his child did not amount to
a violation of the law of nations.339 In coming to that conclusion, the
court acknowledged the ramifications of finding that defendant's
conduct violated the law of nations: "Doing so would permit foreign
plaintiffs to litigate custody disputes in United States federal courts,
thereby turning district courts nationwide into ill-suited family
courts.
' 340 The court clearly concluded that jurisdiction under Alien
Tort Statute's "law of nations" prong would be far broader than
jurisdiction under ICARA, especially as interpreted by the Fourth
Circuit in Cantor.34' However, the court included this important
footnote: "The Court makes explicit, however, that the severity
required for a finding of a law of nations [violation] would almost
certainly be present if an allegation of international child abduction
involved credible allegations of physical, verbal or sexual abuse." '342
According to one scholar, "seven of the nine cases decided by the
United States courts of appeals between July 2000 and January 2001
involved an abductor who alleged that she was a victim of domestic
violence. ' 34 3  Therefore, most defendants are abductor-victims,
whose conduct would not constitute a violation of the law of nations.
However, it is possible that an abductor-perpetrator 3" would be
336. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
337. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
338. Id. at 724-27.
339. Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 916. See supra Part D.2.a.ii for a discussion of the Hague Convention.
342. Id. at 915 n.6.
343. Weiner, Purposive Analysis, supra note 220, at 277.
344. See generally Susan Tiefenbrun, The Cultural, Political, and Legal Climate Behind the
Fight to Stop Trafficking in Women: William J. Clinton's Legacy to Women's Rights, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 855, 855 (2006) ("Each year an estimated 600,000 to 800,000
people-mostly women and young girls-are trafficked across international borders, and millions
more are trafficked within the borders of countries."). It is not inconceivable to imagine a parent
might willingly participate in such trafficking. On the other hand, the Hague Convention as law
of nations will not protect children from "internal" trafficking, where there is no cross-border
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found to violate the law of nations for violating the principles and
obligations of the Hague Convention,345 even if they were not found
to have violated the Hague Convention itself.
E. Conclusion
This article has discussed three categories of treaties and their
implementing legislation, their three avenues or trails into federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331: first, a self-executing treaty
which contains an express or implied private right of action fulfills
Cardozo's Creation test. This avenue is exemplified by the VCCR,346
but is also represented by the Warsaw Convention,347 a treaty not
discussed here. Second, a non-self-executing treaty, whose
provisions are implemented by Congress, and include an express
right of action may be adjudicated in federal court pursuant to §
1331. This avenue is illustrated by the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as discussed supra in
Part D.2.a.ii. Third, a treaty whose implementing provisions
includes a jurisdiction mandate channeling "pure" state law causes of
action into federal court is constitutional because it relates to a
comprehensive federal statutory scheme. This avenue is illustrated
by the New York Convention, as discussed supra in Part D.2.b.ii.
This article also discussed the possibility that a treaty whose
implementing provisions create a primary right and whose violation
constitutes a tort may be invoked by a foreign national in federal
court pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. In
addition, treaties may provide necessary evidence of "norms of
international character accepted by the civilized world" and so
embody a law of nations. Finally, this article has suggested that as
component to invoke the Hague Convention's protections. See Nilanjana Ray, Looking at
Trafficking Through a New Lens, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 909, 916-17 (2006).
345. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 344, at 855 ("Trafficking in women for the purpose of
enslaving them in sex work is one of the oldest and most heinous violations of women's rights.").
346. See supra D.2.a.i.
347. See generally Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cit. 1978);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967); Greg T. Hill, Comment, Terror in the Sky: Does Terrorism Return
Airlines to an Infant Industry? Does the Warsaw Convention Liability Limit Fly High Again to
Protect Vulnerable Airlines?, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 633 (1997); Larry Johnson, Note,
Warsaw Convention-A New Cause of Action for Emotional Distress Under Old Section 17: A
Look at Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1989), 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
619 (1990); Michael P. Munro, Comment, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Warsaw Cases After
Malik v. Butta, 7 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 171 (1994).
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treaties continue to govern domestic areas of law and therefore
individuals' obligations, it is possible that a treaty might form an
essential, substantial, and disputed federal issue such that a state law
cause of action dependant on it would constitute a federal question
sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331.
